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NOTES 
Continuing Criminal Enterprise, Conspiracy, and the Multiple 
Punishment Doctrine 
Kenneth G. Schuler 
In 1970, Congress responded to the near "epidemic"1 drug prob-
lem by enacting the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Con-
trol Act. 2 The Act created the crime of engaging in a continuing 
criminal enterprise (CCE),3 an offense designed "to serve as a strong 
deterrent to those who otherwise might wish to engage in the illicit 
traffic [of narcotics], while also providing a means for keeping those 
found guilty of violations out of circulation."4 Congress hoped to 
achieve its penal objective by targeting "drug kingpins" and subjecting 
offenders to severe mandatory sentences5 without the possibility of pa-
role. 6 The CCE statute requires proof that an individual has commit-
ted a series of violations of the narcotics laws7 while organizing or 
supervising at least five other people. 8 
While several commentators have lamented the impact of the 
"War on Drugs" on civil liberties,9 few have analyzed the relationship 
I. H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 6 (1970), reprinted in 1970 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4572. 
2. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 
(1988 & Supp. III 1991)). 
3. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988). The continuing criminal enterprise offense consists of five ele-
ments: (1) a felony violation of the narcotics laws, § 848(c)(l); (2) as "part of a continuing series 
of violations" of the narcotics laws,§ 848(c)(2); (3) undertaken in concert with five or more other 
persons,§ 848(c)(2)(A); (4) "with respect to whom" the defendant is an organizer or supervisor, 
§ 848(c)(2)(A); and (5) the defendant obtains substantial income from the activities, 
§ 848(c)(2)(B). The third and fourth prongs of the CCE offense therefore require federal prose-
cutors to establish conspiratorial conduct to obtain a conviction. See generally infra text accom-
panying notes 167-74. 
4. H.R. REP. No. 1444, supra note l, pt. 1, at 10, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4576. 
5. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) provides for a minimum of twenty years imprisonment for CCE offend-
ers. The statute also authorizes a life sentence for engaging in a CCE. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)-(b) 
(1988). A CCE defendant also faces the possibility of fines up to two million dollars. 21 U.S.C. 
§ 848(a) (1988). Congress amended the CCE statute in 1988 to allow prosecutors to seek the 
death penalty in cases in which a drug lord causes the murder of an individual. 21 U.S.C. 
§ 848(e) (1988). 
6. 21 U.S.C. § 848(d) prohibits the suspension of sentence for a CCE conviction. 
7. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(l)-(2) (1988). 
8. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2)(A) (1988). 
9. See, e.g., Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging ''Drug Exception" to the Bill of 
Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889 (1987); James B. Speta, Note, Narrowing the Scope of Civil Drug 
Forfeiture: Section 881, Substantial Connection and the Eighth Amendment, 89 MICH. L. REV. 
165 (1990). 
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between continuing criminal enterprise convictions, conspiracy con-
victions, and the Double Jeopardy Clause10 of the Fifth Amend-
ment. I I The potential Double Jeopardy Clause violation arises 
because of the Multiple Punishment Doctrine, which mandates that 
"no man can be twice lawfully punished for the same offence."I2 
Given that prosecutors have broad discretion in selecting charges, 13 
defendants accused of operating a continuing criminal enterprise are 
often charged with conspiring to violate the narcotiCs laws as well. 14 
Courts then must consider whether convicting and sentencing a de-
fendant for both CCE and conspiracy violates the Multiple Punish-
ment Doctrine. The purposes that the Multiple Punishment Doctrine 
serves and the impact that multiple convictions can have upon crimi-
nal defendants both highlight the importance of the issue. Unfortu-
nately, the federal courts have not formulated a consistent solution to 
the question, leaving the contours of the Multiple Punishment Doc-
trine in "disarray."I5 A majority of the circuit courts of appeals hold 
that conspiracy is a lesser-included offense within continuing criminal 
enterprise and vacate convictions and sentences for conspiracy in or-
der to avoid double punishment. I6 Conversely, four circuits have de-
cided that retaining convictions for both CCE and conspiracy does not 
offend the Double Jeopardy Clause, but those circuits disagree as to 
how to deal with the convictions and sentences.17 
This Note argues that the Multiple Punishment Doctrine prohibits 
the imposition of concurrent convictions and sentences upon criminal 
defendants found guilty of engaging in a CCE and conspiring to vio-
late narcotics laws. Part I surveys the values underlying the Multiple 
Punishment Doctrine and traces the evolution of the Supreme Court's 
10. "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy oflife 
or limb ...• " U.S. CoNST. amend. V. 
11. See generally Phillip H. Cherney, Thrice In Jeopardy: The CCE Prosecution of Felix 
Mitchell, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 515 (1987); George C. Thomas III, Sentencing Problems 
Under the Multiple Punishment Doctrine, 31 VILL. L. REv. 1351 (1986); Doreen A. Yanik, Re-
cent Case, 21 SETON HALL L. REv. 514 (1991). 
12. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168 (1873). The Multiple Punishment Doctrine 
is one of the three double jeopardy protections recognized by the Supreme Court. See infra text 
accompanying notes 20-22. 
13. The Supreme Court has held that the state may try a defendant for both greater- and 
lesser-included offenses, even though the defendant may be sentenced for only one of the crimes. 
Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 500 (1984). 
14. See, e.g., United States v. Chambers, 944 F.2d 1253, 1256 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 
112 S. Ct. 1217 (1992); United States v. Medina, 940 F.2d 1247, 1249 (9th Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Duke, 940 F.2d 1113, 1115 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. David, 940 F.2d 722, 726-
27 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2301 (1992); United States v. Paulino, 935 F.2d 739, 
745-46 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 315 (1991); United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 931 F.2d 
148, 152 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 184 (1991). 
15. Fernandez v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2249 (1991) (White, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). 
16. See infra note 103. 
17. See introduction infra section 11.B. 
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application of the doctrine to modern criminal law. Part II examines 
the various methods employed by the circuit courts of appeals to deal 
with simultaneous convictions and sentences for CCE and conspiracy. 
Part III reviews the test, identified in Part I, that the Supreme Court 
has implicitly utilized to analyze Multiple Punishment Claims and 
evaluates CCE and conspiracy convictions under this standard. This 
Note concludes that the majority approach - mandating the vacation 
of conspiracy convictions and sentences obtained simultaneously with 
a CCE conviction - is the only method utilized by the courts of ap-
peals that comports with the Multiple Punishment Doctrine. 
I. THE GENESIS, EVOLUTION, AND PURPOSES OF THE MULTIPLE 
PUNISHMENT DOCTRINE 
This Part reviews the historical underpinnings of the Multiple 
Punishment Doctrine and the manner in which the Supreme Court 
has applied the doctrine to modern criminal law, including continuing 
criminal enterprise prosecutions. Section I.A examines the origin of 
the multiple punishment bar and surveys the doctrine's constitutional 
functions, focusing on protection it provides against adverse collateral 
consequences. Section l.B describes the Supreme Court's test for ana-
lyzing disputes involving the potential for double punishment in viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment. Section I.C reviews the Court's 
interpretation of the doctrine in cases involving CCE convictions and 
concludes that the Supreme Court has not formulated a coherent body 
of precedent for evaluating multiple punishment claims in the CCE 
conspiracy context. 
A. The Purposes of the Multiple Punishment Doctrine 
The notion that no person should be subject to criminal prosecu-
tion or punishment twice for the same offense is perhaps the oldest18 
and most widely recognized19 guarantee in the Bill of Rights. The 
18. See 1 DEMOSTHENES 589 (J.H. Vince trans., 1970), quoted in Whalen v. United States, 
445 U.S. 684, 699 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[T]he laws forbid the same man to be tried 
twice on the same issue ... . ");see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES •335 ("[It is 
a] universal maxim of the common law of England that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of 
his life more than once for the same offense."); 3 EDWARD COKE, INSrITUTES OF THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 213 (London 5th ed. 1797) (1628) (prior acquittal "of the same felony" precludes a 
second trial); 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN ch. 36, § 10, at 
377 (London 4th ed. 1762) (1716-1721) ("the Party ought not to be brought twice into Danger of 
his Life for the same Crime"). 
The Multiple Punishment Doctrine apparently originated out of the plea of autrefoits convict, 
which prevented a person previously convicted and sentenced for an offense from being tried for 
the same crime. See 2 MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 251 (1778). 
19. Both the ancient Greeks and the English common law prohibited double jeopardy. See 
supra note 18. The notion has also been recognized in a number of other Western legal systems, 
including Roman and canon law. See JAY A. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY 1-3 (1969). Jewish law also contained a prohibition on 
the multiplication of punishments. See GEORGE HOROWITZ, THE SPIRIT OF JEWISH LAW 170 
August 1993] Note-Multiple Punishment Doctrine 2223 
Supreme Court describes double jeopardy as encompassing three sepa-
rate protections: protection against retrial following acquittal, protec-
tion against retrial following conviction, and protection against 
multiple punishments for the same offense.20 The Court long ago rec-
ognized that the third protection - "that no man can be twice law-
fully punished for the same offence"21 - was "clearly [contained 
within] the spirit of the [Fifth Amendment]."22 
The seminal case regarding multiple punishment, Ex parte 
Lange, 23 involved a claim of excessive punishment raised by a defend-
ant sentenced to both imprisonment and a fine, even though the appli-
cable statute authorized only one of the punishments. 24 The Court, 
after surveying the common law,. reasoned that the protection against 
multiple punishments forms the core of the Double Jeopardy Clause: 
For of what avail is the constitutional protection against more than one 
trial if there can be any number of sentences pronounced on the same 
verdict? Why is it that, having once been tried and found guilty, [a per-
son] can never be tried again for that offence? Manifestly it is not the 
danger or jeopardy of being a second time found guilty. It is the punish-
ment that would legally follow the second conviction which is the real dan-
ger guarded against by the Constitution. 25 
The Court ordered Lange's release because he had fully satisfied one of 
(1953) ("for one offense, only one punishment might be inflicted"). Today, the right of a crimi-
nal defendant not to be subjected to punishment more than once for a crime is well recognized in 
industrialized societies. See generally SIGLER, supra, at 118-54. 
20. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 
395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)). 
21. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168 (1873). 
22. Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 170. 
23. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873). 
24. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 175. 
25. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 173 (emphasis added). Several commentators have argued that the 
Framers of the Constitution viewed the protection against multiple punishments as the preemi-
nent aspect of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See, e.g., Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 
266 n.13 (1965). The argument stems from Madison's initial wording of the Clause, which pro-
vided that "[n]o person shall be subject •.. to more than one punishment or one trial for the 
same offence." l ANNALS OF CONG. 451-52 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). 
This argument presumes that, although the wording of the Clause was altered, the meaning 
assigned to the Clause was not. The limited record surrounding the change in wording does not 
provide any definitive reason to accept or reject this notion. Representative Benson moved to 
amend the original wording of the Clause to ensure habeas corpus relief, arguing that the prohi-
bition on multiple trials would prevent persons convicted unfairly from obtaining a second trial. 
In his estimation, "[t]he humane intention of the clause was to prevent more than one punish-
ment." Id. at 782. The amendment was defeated by a large margin, however. Id. Representa-
tive Lawrence subsequently introduced a motion to limit the right against self-incrimination to 
criminal trials, which was adopted. Id. Representative Lawrence's refined wording apparently 
altered the phrasing of the Double Jeopardy Clause as well. 
The Supreme Court has apparently accepted this reading of the Double Jeopardy Clause's 
historical significance. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989) (noting that "[i]n 
drafting his initial version of what came to be our Double Jeopardy Clause, James Madison 
focused explicitly on the issue of multiple punishment"). 
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the alternative statutory penalties. 26 In so doing, the Court recognized 
the Multiple Punishment Doctrine as an essential foundation of the 
Constitution's bulwark protecting criminal defendants from double 
jeopardy. 
The judiciary has not interpreted the prohibition on multiple pun-
ishments consistently, however. One commentator astutely suggests 
that judges have conducted Double Jeopardy Clause inquiries without 
reference to the justifications which should inform a court's decision-
making. 27 Such lackadaisical jurisprudence may explain why then-
Justice Rehnquist noted that double jeopardy doctrine was mired in 
"confusion."28 Yet, the purposes underlying a rule of law may ulti-
mately be the most important guide in conducting the judicial inquiry 
in an individual case.29 Hence, an inquiry into the constitutionality of 
imposing convictions and sentences for both CCE and conspiracy 
ought to begin with the purposes underlying the Multiple Punishment 
Doctrine. Using these goals to analyze multiple punishment claims 
should yield a better decisionmaking process and a presumptively su-
perior result. 
The Multiple Punishment Doctrine serves three constitutional 
objectives. Initially, the doctrine limits the state's discretion to subject 
a citizen to punishment exceeding that condoned by the legislature by 
acting through the office of the prosecutor.30 Indeed, the doctrine's 
significance has become more pronounced as the proliferation of statu-
tory offenses has greatly increased the prosecutor's power over a crimi-
nal defendant.31 This imbalance of power may manifest itself in 
26. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 175. 
27. Note, supra note 25, at 266 ("We are rarely told why it is wrong to retry for the same 
crime or punish twice .... The judiciary is content to apply the double jeopardy prohibition with 
only a reverent nod to its policies."); see also United States v. Maza, 983 F.2d 1004, 1010 (11th 
Cir. 1993) ("Unfortunately, case law interpreting the Double Jeopardy Clause is often applied 
without regard to the context in which it arose .... The rather indiscriminate application of the 
rules from one context into another puts at risk many of the interests the Double Jeopardy 
Clause is intended to protect .•.. "). 
28. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 699 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
29. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112 (1921) 
("Which of these forces shall dominate in any case must depend largely upon the comparative 
importance or value of the social interests that will be thereby promoted or impaired."); O.W. 
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897) ("Still it is true that a body of 
law is more rational and more civilized when every rule it contains is referred articulately and 
definitively to an end which it subserves, and when the grounds for desiring that end are stated or 
are ready to be stated in words."). 
30. See, e.g., SIGLER, supra note 19, at 182-87; Cherney, supra note 11, at 519-20; Note, 
supra note 25, at 304-06. The Supreme Court has emphasized that the Double Jeopardy Clause 
generally limits the power of prosecutors to obtain punishment in excess of that authorized by 
the legislature. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977). 
31. See SIGLER, supra note 19, at 156 ("[A]n increasing number of criminal statutes have 
been created, a development which has weakened the significance of double jeopardy as it has 
increased the power of the prosecutor."); Note, supra note 25, at 304. The prosecutor's advan-
tage may be even greater when conspiracy charges are brought in addition to substantive of-
fenses, as in the context of a CCE prosecution. SIGLER, supra note 19, at 171-72 ("Federal 
August 1993] Note-Multiple Punishment Doctrine 2225 
several ways. The profusion of statutory crimes allows the prosecutor 
to choose a punishment and select a crime to fit that punishment. 32 A 
prosecutor might also threaten to seek convictions under a variety of 
overlapping statutes to coerce a defendant into accepting a plea bar-
gain. 33 Finally, the ability to prosecute a defendant for several statu-
tory offenses increases the probability that the prosecutor will obtain a 
conviction on at least one of the charges. 34 
The importance of protection from arbitrary and oppressive 
prosecutorial conduct should be readily apparent: "Double jeopardy 
was designed to thwart government tyranny. A disgruntled prosecu-
tor or an inflamed democracy can be just as tyrannical as a mon-
arch."35 Judicial enforcement of the Multiple Punishment Doctrine 
blunts the ability of a prosecutor to utilize such discretion against a 
defendant. 36 
The Multiple Punishment Doctrine concomitantly reinforces the 
constitutionally mandated demarcation of powers between the three 
branches of government. 37 A court can punish a defendant under 
multiple statutory provisions only if the legislature has authorized 
punishment under two or more statutes. 38 This rule reflects the legis-
lature's exclusive authority to define criminal behavior and to establish 
appropriate punishments. 39 As the Supreme Court has noted, "[i]f a 
attorneys have been most adept in the use of of conspiracy charges to secure more ease in utiliz-
ing evidence, to avoid the statute of limitations, to obtain more and easier double convictions, 
and to bolster their personal reputation for diligence."). 
32. Note, supra note 25, at 304-05. 
33. Id. at 305 ("Given the choice of contesting guilt and risking crushing sentence, or plead-
ing guilty to one of the offenses, an uncertain defendant may well capitulate."). 
34. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 372 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[W]here the 
prosecution's evidence is weak, its ability to bring multiple charges may substantially enhance the 
possibility that, even though innocent, the defendant may be found guilty on one or more charges 
as a result of a compromise verdict."); see also Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 867 (1985) 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that prosecutorial tactic of bringing multiple charges tends to 
"tilt the scales of justice against the defendant"). This type of state conduct has been approved 
by the Court, however. See supra note 13. 
35. Note, supra note 25, at 292. 
36. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977) ("The Double Jeopardy Clause is not such a 
fragile guarantee that prosecutors can avoid its limitations by the simple expedient of dividing a 
single crime into a series of temporal or spatiiµ units."). 
37. See, e.g., Michael P. Doss, Comment, Resentencing Defendants and the Protection 
Against Multiple Punishment, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 1409, 1419 (1985) ("[T]he multiple punish-
ment bar act[s] as a restriction upon judicial power."). 
38. See infra text accompanying notes 74-78. Indeed, the Supreme Court has suggested that 
"the role of the constitutional guarantee [against double jeopardy] is limited to assuring that the 
court does not exceed its legislative authorization." Brown, 432 U.S. at 165 (emphasis added); 
see also Hunter, 459 U.S. at 366 ("[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the 
sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended.") (emphasis 
added). For a criticism of this approach, see infra note 75. 
39. See, e.g., Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368 ("Legislatures, not courts, prescribe the scope of pun-
ishments."). Peter Westen and Richard Drube! suggest that double jeopardy also constrains the 
legislature's power to fashion penalties. They argue that "the Double Jeopardy Clause acts as an 
indirect restraint on the legislature, because it demands a certain standard of clarity from the 
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federal court exceeds its own authority by imposing multiple punish-
ments not authorized by Congress, it violates . . . the constitutional 
principle of separation of powers. "40 
The importance of maintaining strict boundaries between the pow-
ers of the three branches of government in our democracy is undis-
puted. 41 Violation of the separation of powers in the criminal justice 
context uniquely corrodes our system of republican government, 42 for 
the division of power between the legislature and the judiciary in the 
area of criminal law is indispensable to democratic governance.43 
Moreover, a judge's ability to cumulate punishments for overlapping 
offenses represents "[b]y its nature ... an arbitrary power."44 While 
guidelines afford judges latitude to determine individual sentences, the 
number of statutes violated by a single act of the defendant simply "is 
not relevant" to that determination. 45 
Finally, the Multiple Punishment Doctrine provides a measure of 
finality for the criminal defendant. The prohibition on multiple pun-
ishments minimizes the defendant's "anxiety and insecurity"46 regard-
ing the sentencing process.47 Once a defendant has "fully suffered ... 
[the] punishment[] to which alone the law subjected him,"48 the impo-
sition of further sanctions offends universal notions of fairness.49 The 
legislature before multiple punishment will be allowed." Peter Westen & Richard Drube!, To· 
ward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 SUP. Cr. REv. 81, 118. 
40. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689 (1980); see also Brown, 432 U.S. at 165 
("once the legislature has acted courts may not impose more than one punishment for the same 
offense"); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 178 (1873) (after sentencing a defendant to the 
maximum penalty for an offense, "[the court's] authority was ended"). 
41. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697-99 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); THE 
FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison). 
42. See Whalen, 445 U.S. at 689 (judicial overreaching in the sentencing context "trenches 
particularly harshly on individual liberty"). 
43. See, e.g., CHARLES DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 152 
(Thomas Nugent trans., 1966) ("Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not sepa· 
rated from the legislative • . • • Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the 
subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would be then the legislator."). 
44. Note, supra note 25, at 306. 
45. Id. at 307; cf. UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4Al.2(a)(2) 
(1990) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.] (concurrent sentences are not aggregated for the purpose of estab· 
lishing a defendant's criminal history points). 
46. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957). 
47. See United States v. McHan, 966 F.2d 134, 139 (4th Cir. 1992) ("The Double Jeopardy 
Clause imposes a rule of finality for criminal law judgments to protect persons from the burden, 
expense, embarrassment, and harassment of multiple prosecutions and punishments for the same 
offense."); cf. Doss, supra note 37, at 1419-20 (arguing that double jeopardy protects a defend· 
ant's interest in finality and therefore precludes resentencing on counts remaining after reversal 
of the primary convictions). 
48. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 176 (1873). 
49. Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 178 (excess punishment is forbidden "by the dearest princi-
ples of personal rights"); see also United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 (1989) (describing 
"the 'humane interests' safeguarded by the Double Jeopardy Clause's proscription of multiple 
punishments" and declaring that "[the] constitutional protection [against multiple punishments] 
is intrinsically personal."). 
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Multiple Punishment Doctrine guarantees a defendant that satisfac-
tion of the legislatively authorized sentence will terminate the punish-
ment imposed by society. In Ball v. United States, 50 the Court 
recognized the potential for "adverse collateral consequences"51 when 
a defendant is convicted of multiple, overlapping offenses. Criminal 
convictions are often used to deny parole, to impeach a witness' testi-
mony, and to enhance sentences under recidivist statutes. Convictions 
for lesser-included offenses may therefore result in adverse conse-
quences in subsequent criminal proceedings. Ball construed the Mul-
tiple Punishment Doctrine to limit the legal effects of a single act in 
future legal proceedings, reinforcing finality in the criminal justice 
system. 
The Supreme Court has identified four adverse consequences that 
might fl.ow from the retention of unconstitutional convictions upon a 
defendant's record: the social stigma resulting from a felony convic-
tion, ineligibility for parole, impeachment of character in future legal 
proceedings, and increased sentences under recidivist statutes. 52 The 
effect of additional convictions on a person's reputation cannot be 
quantified, yet the Constitution creates a presumption that the incre-
mental degradation associated with each conviction constitutes pun-
ishment. 53 This consequence alone might justify the conclusion that 
the retention of conspiracy convictions in addition to a CCE convic-
tion is constitutionally suspect. The reduced possibility for parole, 
however, is irrelevant in this context because the CCE statute forbids 
the suspension of a sentence imposed for the offense. 54 
Three adverse consequences may fl.ow from allowing convictions 
for conspiracy to coexist with a CCE conviction. First, the multiplica-
tion of convictions increases the defendant's susceptibility to impeach-
ment in subsequent legal proceedings. Evidence of prior felony 
convictions is admissible to impeach a witness at trial. 55 The retention 
50. 470 U.S. 856 (1985). 
51. 470 U.S. at 865. 
52. 470 U.S. at 865; see also Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 579 n.3 (1969); Sibron v. New 
York, 392 U.S. 40, 55-56 (1968); Carafas v. La Vallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1968). 
53. See Sibron 392 U.S. at 40: 
It is impossible for this Court to say at what point the number of convictions on a man's 
record renders his reputation irredeemable. And even if we believed that an individual had 
reached that point, it would be impossil1le for us to say that he had no interest in beginning 
the process of redemption with the particular case sought to be adjudicated. 
392 U.S. at 56 (footnote omitted). 
54. 21 u.s.c. § 848(d) (1988). 
55. See FED. R. Evm. 609. Most states have similar rules governing the admissibility of 
evidence establishing past criminal wrongdoing. See, e.g., McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 43, at 
93-95 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984). The federal rule does contain a potential safeguard 
against the utilization of convictions for conspiracy, however. The Federal Rules of Evidence 
allow the prosecution to offer proof of past convictions provided that "the court determines that 
the probative value of admitting [the] evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant." 
FED. R. Evm. 609(a). This requirement, however, hardly inspires enough confidence to enable 
one to presume that there is no danger of collateral punishment. 
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of convictions for both the greater and lesser offenses increases the 
chance that an adverse party can successfully impeach the credibility 
of the former prisoner, as the sheer number of convictions may unduly 
influence a jury. "Although [the defendant] could explain that [the] 
convictions arose out of the same transaction, a jury might not be able 
to appreciate this subtlety."56 The credibility of a previously con-
victed felon might then play a pivotal role in deciding that person's 
fate in a subsequent criminal proceeding. 57 
The potential sentencing of a defendant as a recidivist presents ad-
ditional adverse collateral consequences in the CCE context. 
Although the federal sentencing guidelines count only those convic-
tions arising from separate transactions in calculating a defendant's 
criminal history score, 58 many states have enacted less sophisticated 
recidivist sentencing statutes. Such statutes merely count the number 
of convictions on a defendant's record, regardless of the circumstances 
under which those convictions were obtained. 59 A convicted CCE 
56. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 791 (1969). 
57. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 720 F.2d 519, 522 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. 
Ct. 1310 (1984) (defendant convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine; admission .of evidence 
of prior convictions upheld "in view of the importance of Johnson's credibility"); United States 
v. Young, 702 F.2d 133, 137 (8th Cir. 1983) (defendant convicted of assault; admission of prior 
conviction upheld because "[c]redibility was extremely important in this case"). 
58. U.S.S.G., supra note 45, § 4Al.2 application note 3 (1990) ("Cases are considered related 
if they (1) occurred on a single occasion, (2) were part of a single common scheme or plan, or (3) 
were consolidated for trial or sentencing."). The Sentencing Manual does invite judges to depart 
from the guidelines in the event that the exclusion of related convictions "underrepresents the 
seriousness of the defendant's criminal history and the danger that he presents to the public." Id. 
Hence, the possibility exists that the retention of lesser-included offenses will generate adverse 
collateral consequences in the Federal penal system. 
59. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-9 (1975) (distinguishing between two and three prior convictions); 
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125 (1962 & Supp. 1992) (distinguishing between two and three prior 
convictions); ARK. CoDE ANN. § 5-4-501 (Michie 1987) (distinguishing between four or fewer 
felony convictions); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4214 (1987 & Supp. 1992) (distinguishing be-
tween two and three prior convictions); FLA. STAT. ch. 775.084 (1991); HAW. REV. STAT.§ 706-
606.5 (Supp. 1992) (distinguishing between two and three prior convictions); IDAHO CODE§ 19-
2514 (1987); IOWA CODE§ 902.8 (1983); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 21-4504 (1988); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN.§ 529.1 (West 1992) (distinguishing between two, three, and four prior convictions); MICH. 
CoMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 769.11, 769.12 (West Supp. 1991) (distinguishing between two and three 
prior convictions); NEV. REv. STAT. § 207.010 (1991) (distinguishing between two and three 
prior convictions); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-09(1) (Supp. 1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2929.01 (Baldwin 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-35-106 to -108 (1990) (distinguishing four 
or more prior convictions); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 11 (1974); WASH. REV. CODE§ 9.92.090 
(West 1988); W. VA. CODE§ 61-11-18 (1992). 
Three states require that a sentence have been imposed on the conviction in order for it to be 
counted under the recidivist sentencing statute. See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 279, § 25 (1990); NED. 
REV. STAT. § 29-2221 (1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-1001 (Supp. 1992). Collateral conse-
quences would flow from the imposition of concurrent sentences for conspiracy convictions in 
these states, rendering suspect the Seventh Circuit's assertion that such sentences entail "no risk 
of collateral consequences." United States v. Bond, 847 F.2d 1233, 1239 (7th Cir. 1988). 
Most jurisdictions follow the federal scheme and require that convictions arise out of separate 
transactions to count against the defendant under the recidivist sentencing scheme. ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN.§ 13-604(H) (1989); CAL. PENAL CODE§ 667(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991); COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 16-13-101(1)-(2) (1986); CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-40(d) (1983); D.C. CODE 
ANN. § 22-104a(b)(2) (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-7(c) (1990); ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 38, 
August 1993] Note-Multiple Punishment Doctrine 2229 
felon may confront the prospect of sentencing in a state with such a 
crude criminal conviction accounting system. 60 "[T]his possibility ... 
[although] remote,"61 clearly magnifies the defendant's punishment 
when lesser-included convictions are retained. 62 
Finally, simultaneous convictions for CCE and conspiracy may 
subject a defendant to lengthy pretrial detention if the defendant is 
later arrested on unrelated charges. The government can detain per-
sons arrested in the federal system until trial based in part on their 
"criminal history."63 A majority of states have similar provisions.64 
para. 33B-l(c) (1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8(b) (Supp. 1979); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 532.080(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.152(c) (West Supp. 1991); 
Miss. CoDE ANN. § 99-19-81 (Supp. 1992); Mo. REv. STAT. § 558.016(3) (Supp. 1992); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 46-18-501 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:6(1)(c) (1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2C44-3(a) (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 31-18-17 (Michie Supp. 1992); N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 70.lO(c) (McKinney 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-7.1 (1986); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 12.1-32-
09(1)(c) (Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. TIT. 21, § 51(B) (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-21(A) 
(Supp. 1992); s.c. CoDE ANN.§ 17-25-50 (Law. Co-op 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.§ 22-
7-9 (1988); Tux. PENAL CODE ANN.§ 12.42 (West Supp. 1990); WYO. STAT.§ 6-10-201 (1988). 
Five states have enacted habitual offender laws that require only that a person have been 
convicted of one previous felony. In these states, the retention of convictions on the lesser-in-
cluded conspiracy counts would not affect the flow of collateral consequences because the CCE 
conviction would suffice to justify the additional incarceration authorized by the statute. ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 757 (West Supp. 1992); Mo. CRIM. LAW CooE ANN.§ 643B (1988); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 161.725(2) (1991); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9714(a) (1982); WIS. STAT. 
§ 939.62(2) (1989-1990). 
Virginia has not enacted a recidivist sentencing statute. 
60. A previously convicted felon would encounter the prospect of adverse consequences 
under two types of habitual offender sentencing plans. In the states that simply require convic-
tion of a person for a minimum number of offenses to be considered a recidivist, a single criminal 
scheme could qualify the person as a habitual felon, regardless of the fact that the convictions 
stemmed from the "same transaction." In those states that adjust the severity of the sentence 
handed out to habitual felons, multiple conspiracy convictions arising out of one criminal enter-
prise may well qualify a defendant under the most serious offender status, earning the defendant 
a term of life imprisonment. See supra note 59. 
61. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 790-91 (1969). 
62. Benton, 395 U.S. at 790-91. 
63. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3)(A) (1988). 
64. See generally JOHN s. GOLDKAMP, Two CLASSES OF ACCUSED: A STUDY OF BAIL AND 
DETENTION IN AMERICA 67 (1979) ("Prior criminal record is specified [as a criteria for withold-
ing bail] in the guidelines of thirty-six states."); id. at 60 ("Overall, the right to bail described in 
state guidelines appears to be defined principally in terms of seriousness of the offense charged, 
possible penalty, and record of prior convictions."). 
Several states permit pretrial detention based in part on an accused's record of convictions. 
See CAL. PENAL CODE§ 1275 (West Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-lOl(b)(Ill) (Supp. 
1992); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 110-6.l(d)(2)(A) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); MASS. GEN. L. 
ch. 276, § 58 (1990); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. L. §§ 510.10-.30 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1993). 
Most states look at prior convictions to determine the conditions to be imposed pursuant to 
pretrial release. See ALA. R. CRIM. PROC. 7.2(a) (1992); ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020(c)(8) 
(1990); ARK. R. CRIM. PROC. 8.5(b)(vii) (Michie 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2105 (1987); 
D.C. CODE ANN.§ 23-1321(b) (1989); FLA. STAT. ch. 903.046(2) (1991); IDAHO CRIM. R. 46(a) 
(1992); IOWA CODE§ 811.2(2) (1983); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 22-2802(4) (1988); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 15, § 1026(4) (West Supp. 1992); Mo. CODE ANN., Ct. R. 4-216(1) (1993); MINN. R. 
CRIM. PROC. 6.02(2) (West 1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 544.455(2) (1986); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§§ 46-9-301, -501 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT.§ 29-901.01 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 178.4851, 
.4853 (1991); N.J. R. CRIM. PRAC. 326-4 Cmt. (West 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15a-534(c) 
(1988); N.D. R. CRIM. PROC. 46(a)(l)(ii) (1992-1993); Omo R. CRIM. PROC. 46(F) (Baldwin 
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The government may use multiple convictions for the same conduct to 
justify the lengthy incarceration of a defendant awaiting trial, a situa-
tion implicating "the individual's strong interest in liberty."65 Hence, 
the retention of convictions for conspiracy, obtained simultaneously 
with a CCE conviction, potentially implicates the finality interest safe-
guarded by the Multiple Punishment Doctrine. 66 
The Multiple Punishment Doctrine affords criminal defendants 
protection against prosecutorial overreaching, undergirds the separa-
tion of legislative and judicial power, and promotes finality in criminal 
punishment. While it is easy to identify the protection offered by the 
doctrine, the procedure for evaluating cumulative punishment claims 
is not. The next section analyzes the Supreme Court's multiple pun-
ishment jurisprudence to isolate the test for scrutinizing complaints of 
excessive punishment. 
B. Analyzing Multiple Punishment Claims 
Although one commentator describes double jeopardy doctrine as 
a "Gordian knot,"67 a careful reading of the Supreme Court's pro-
nouncements on the multiple punishment bar reveals a vague but use-
ful strand of analysis for evaluating double punishment claims. 68 A 
1992); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 135.230-.265 (1991); PA. R. CRIM. PROC. 4004 (1992); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS§ 12-13-1.3(b) (Supp. 1992); s.c. CODE ANN.§ 17-15-30 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS§ 23A-43-4 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-118(b) (1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
13, § 7554(b) (Supp. 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-123(A) (Michie Supp. 1992); Wis. STAT. 
§ 9.69.01(4) (1989-1990). Texas common law allows similar results based in part on previous 
convictions. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 829 S.W.2d 885, 887 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992). Some states 
permit the amount of bail to reflect the defendant's prior convictions. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
33-8-4(b) (West 1986); KY. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 431.525(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); LA. 
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 317 (West Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE§ 62-lC-3 (1992). The 
greater the number of convictions on a defendant's record, the more likely that the conditions 
accompanying release will be onerous - that is, heavily supervised release, release into custody, 
or extremely high bail. See GOLDKAMP, supra, at 67-68 (describing how states use defendants' 
prior criminal record to set high bail). 
65. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987). Others describe the deprivation of 
liberty accompanying pretrial detention and bail differently. See, e.g., ROY B. FLEMMING, PUN-
ISHMENT BEFORE TRIAL 2 (1982) ("Punishment before trial, then, shares the same features as 
sentencing following conviction. Defendants lose their liberty, spend time in jail, and incur finan-
cial penalties."); Louis M. Natali, Jr. & Edward D. Ohlbaum, Redrafting the Due Process Model: 
The Preventive Detention Blueprint, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 1225, 1260 (1989) (lamenting "the right 
snatched away by the Court in Salerno" as a possible "harbinger of the future emasculation of 
civil liberty"). 
66. Retention of conspiracy convictions offends the doctrine only if conspiracy is a lcsser-
included offense within CCE and Congress did'not intend to punish the offenses cumulatively. 
These subjects are discussed in Part III, infra. 
67. George C. Thomas, Multiple Punishments for the Same Offense: The Analysis After Mis-
souri v. Hunter or Don Quixote, the Sargasso Sea, and the Gordian Knot, 62 WASH. U. L.Q. 79, 
79 & n.* (quoting Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 702 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)) 
(1984). 
68. See Julie R. Niemeyer, Casenote, The Multiple Punishment Protection of the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause: Thomas v. Morris, 22 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1081, 1100-01 (1989) (describing a 
two-part inquiry into multiple punishment claims). 
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court facing an excessive punishment claim must initially decide 
whether the crimes constitute identical offenses. If the offenses over-
lap for double jeopardy purposes, courts may still impose punishment 
on each count if the legislature has authorized them to do so. Absent 
a clear expression of the legislature's will, the Constitution requires the 
court to vacate convictions for lesser-included offenses to avoid cumu-
lative punishment. 69 
The Supreme Court announced the first step in conducting a multi-
ple punishment analysis - discerning whether two crimes constitute 
the "same offense" - in Blockburger v. United States. 70 In deciding 
whether statutory offenses overlap, "the test to be applied ... is 
whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does 
not."71 Courts functionally conduct the analysis in terms of greater 
and lesser offenses. For example, the Court has noted that in order to 
convict a defendant of auto theft, a state must establish the lesser of-
fense of joyriding, because all the elements of joyriding are also ele-
ments oftheft.72 In such a situation, "[t]he greater offense is therefore 
by definition the 'same' for purposes of double jeopardy as any lesser 
offense included in it."73 No multiple punishment occurs if a court 
finds that two offenses are distinct. 
A conclusion that two charges overlap and therefore place a de-
fendant in jeopardy of being convicted for a greater and lesser offense, 
however, does not end the inquiry. If "Congress intended ... to im-
pose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not vio-
late the Constitution."74 The rule of statutory construction outlined in 
Blockburger does not control when the legislature reveals its intent to 
punish cumulatively.75 An excessive punishment claim obviously 
69. See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-65 (1985). 
70. 284 U.S. 299 (1932). 
71. 284 U.S. at 304;see also Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 517 n.8 (1990) ("Blockburger [is] 
a test to determine the permissibility of cumulative punishments."). 
72. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 167-68 (1977). 
73. Brown, 432 U.S. at 168. 
74. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981). 
75. E.g., Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1982) (if "a legislature specifically autho-
rizes cumulative punishment ... a court's task of statutory construction is at an end"); Albernaz, 
450 U.S. at 340. Some commentators criticize the Court's willingness to defer to the legislative 
branch. They argue that the Court has undermined the substantive protection of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause by defining its scope in terms of legislative formality. See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 
370-74 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("If the Double Jeopardy Clause imposed no restrictions on a 
legislature's power to authorize multiple punishment, there would be no limit to the number of 
convictions a State could obtain on the basis of the same act .... "); Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 333 
(Stewart, J., concurring) ("No matter how clearly it spoke, Congress could not constitutionally 
provide for cumulative punishments unless each statutory offense required proof of a fact that the 
other did not .•.• ");Westen & Drube!, supra note 39, at 113 (the view "that the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause imposes no restrictions whatsoever on the legislature's definition of offenses ... 
contradicts a handful of decisions"); Doss, supra note 37, at 1421 ("[T)he multiple punishment 
bar would be rendered meaningless by a reading that it protects only against the imposition of 
sentences in excess of legislated limits."). 
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"cannot be resolved without determining what punishments the Legis-
lative Branch has authorized."76 If the relevant legislative history 
reveals an intent to authorize punishment under two overlapping stat-
utes, a court should defer to the legislative will and impose a sentence 
for each violation. 11 If, however, an analysis of legislative intent fails 
to yield a definitive result, a court should vacate the convictions on the 
lesser counts to avoid adverse collateral consequences and the prospect 
of multiple punishment. 7s 
The Supreme Court has formulated, albeit not explicitly acknowl-
edged, this two-step inquiry for cumulative punishment claims. As 
the next section demonstrates, the Court has largely followed this ju-
risprudence in cumulative punishment cases challenging convictions 
and sentences under the CCE statute. 
C. Supreme Court Treatment of CCE and Double Jeopardy 
The Supreme Court has examined the interaction between the con-
tinuing criminal enterprise statute and the Double Jeopardy Clause on 
two occasions. In Jeffers v. United States, 19 the Court questioned 
whether the government may punish an individual for both CCE and 
conspiracy to violate narcotics laws under 21 U.S.C. § 846.80 The 
government initially indicted Garland Jeffers for conspiring to dis-
tribute cocaine and heroin, and it later indicted him for engaging in a 
continuing criminal enterprise.81 Jeffers resisted the government's mo-
tion to consolidate the two trials, arguing that the proceedings would 
prejudice him since the indictments involved different groups of code-
fendants. 82 The district court denied the government's motion and 
conducted separate trials. 83 Jeffers was found guilty at both trials. 
Jeffers appealed, claiming that his conspiracy conviction precluded a 
subsequent conviction for CCE. Jeffers predicated his argument on 
the notion that conspiracy is a lesser-included offense within CCE. 84 
The Court held that the subsequent prosecution did not offend the 
Double Jeopardy Clause because Jeffers had prevented a consolidated 
76. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 688 (1980); see also A/bernaz, 450 U.S. at 332 
("[T]he question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is not different from the 
question of what punishments the Legislative Branch intended to be imposed."). 
77. See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368; Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 343. 
78. See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864 (1985) ("[T]he only remedy consistent with 
the congressional intent is for the District Court . . . to vacate one of the underlying 
convictions."). 
79. 432 U.S. 137 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
80. 432 U.S. at 146-47. 
81. 432 U.S. at 140-141. 
82. 432 U.S. at 142-43. 
83. 432 U.S. at 143. 
84. 432 U.S. at 144-46. Jeffers originally raised the argument in an attempt to block the 
second trial but was not able to persuade either the trial or the appellate courts to do so. 432 
U.S. at 144. 
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trial, thereby "waiving" his right to challenge the proceedings. 85 
The Court then evaluated Jeffers' claim that his sentences for the 
CCE conviction and the conspiracy convictions violated the multiple 
punishment bar. The Court assumed that conspiracy to distribute nar-
cotics is a lesser-included offense within CCE, 86 as CCE requires proof 
of "concert[ ed]" action between five or more individuals. 87 The Jeffers 
Court did not hold that CCE and conspiracy are overlapping offenses, 
however. 88 The Court instead turned to the legislative history of the 
CCE statute, finding no conclusive evidence that Congress intended to 
inflict cumulative punishment.89 Its inquiry complete,90 the Court 
concluded that Jeffers had indeed suffered double punishment because 
the lower court has fined him in excess of the statutory limit for CCE 
convictions.91 However, the Court expressly declined to decide 
whether the imposition of concurrent sentences for conspiracy violated 
the multiple punishment bar because Jeffers' life sentence without pos-
sibility for parole negated any possible adverse collateral 
consequences. 92 
The Court returned to analyze the relationship between CCE and 
double jeopardy in Garrett v. United States. 93 Garrett pled guilty to 
one count of importation of marijuana in the Western District of 
Washington.94 He was subsequently indicted and convicted in Florida 
85. 432 U.S. at 154. 
86. The Court based its assumption on the traditional Blockburger analysis. See 432 U.S. at 
150 ("§ 846 is a lesser-included offense of§ 848, because§ 848 requires proof of every fact neces-
sary to show a violation under§ 846"); 432 U.S. at 153 ("If the two charges had been tried in one 
proceeding, it appears that [Jeffers] would have been entitled to a lesser-included offense-
instruction. "). 
87. 432 U.S. at 148-49. 
88. See 432 U.S. at 153 n.20 (Jeffers does not settle whether conspiracy is a lesser-included 
offense "definitively."). 
89. 432 U.S. at 155-57. As the Court noted, the House Report issued in conjunction with the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, supra note 2, indicates that 
Congress intended CCE to constitute an exclusive penalty for those charged under its provisions. 
See H.R. REP. No. 1444, supra note 1, pt. 1, at 10, reprinted in 1910 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4576 
("Except when continuing criminal enterprises serve as the basis for an indictment ... [narcotics 
offenses] will carry penalties which vary, depending upon the danger of the drugs involved."). 
90. Though the Court had evaluated Jeffers' argument by the traditional method of analyz-
ing the offenses under the B/ockburger test and then proceeding to examine congressional intent 
for permission to impose cumulative punishment, it rather cryptically denied conducting the 
two-step inquiry. Justice Blackmun maintained that because the Court had found no evidence of 
legislative intent to authorize multiple punishments, "this again makes it unnecessary to reach 
the lesser included offense issue." Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 155. The Court, however, scrutinized the 
issue in precisely the opposite manner. The Court presumed that conspiracy was a lesser-in-
cluded offense and then proceeded to examine congressional intent. See supra notes 86 & 88. 
91. 432 U.S. at 157-58. 
92. 432 U.S. at 155 n.24. The Court subsequently decided that convictions and sentences for 
lesser-included offenses generally offend the Multiple Punishment Doctrine. See Ball v. United 
States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-65 (1985); see also Thomas, supra note 11, at 1391-92 (arguing that Ball 
implicitly overruled Jeffers). 
93. 471 U.S. 773 (1985). 
94. 471 U.S. at 775. 
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for conspiring to possess marijuana with intent to distribute and for 
participating in a CCE.95 The government submitted proof of the 
Washington importation scheme to establish one of the "continuing 
series of violations" required by 21 U.S.C. § 848(c).96 Garrett ad-
vanced two arguments on appeal. Initially, he argued that the use of 
the Washington scheme at the Florida trial placed him twice in jeop-
ardy for the Washington transaction. The Court summarily rejected 
this claim, noting that Garrett's case fell within the well-recognized 
rule that jeopardy does not attach until an individual has completed 
all the elements of a crime. 97 Otherwise, the Court suggested, this 
theory would force the government into the "absurd" position of per-
mitting a drug dealer to continue his operations until it could amass 
proof of a CCE violation.98 
The Court also rejected Garrett's contention that the consecutive 
sentences imposed for importation and CCE constituted excessive 
punishment. The Court agreed that Garrett's offenses might be identi-
cal under the Blockburger test,99 but it found that "[t]he language, 
95. 471 U.S. at 776-77. 
96. 471 U.S. at 776. 
97. 471 U.S. at 787-93. See in this regard Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 n.7 (1977) ("An 
exception [to the Double Jeopardy Clause] may exist where the State is unable to proceed on the 
more serious charge at the outset because the additional facts necessary to sustain that charge 
have not occurred .... "). 
98. Garrett, 471 U.S. at 785-86. 
99. The Garrett Court cautioned in dicta against the "ready transposition of the 'lesser-in-
cluded offense' principles of double jeopardy from the classically simple situation presented in 
Brown [v. Ohio] to the multilayered conduct, both as to time and to place, involved in [a CCE 
prosecution]." 471 U.S. at 789. The Court made this statement in the context of discussing 
Garrett's successive prosecution claim. Yet the Court conducted the traditional, two-step in-
quiry into Garrett's multiple punishment claim. See 471 U.S. at 779-80 (conducting two-step 
inquiry and concluding that "the Blockburger presumption must of course yield to a plainly 
expressed contrary view on the part of Congress [regarding cumulative punishment]"). 
The Supreme Court has recently questioned the wisdom of applying the traditional lesser-
included offense analysis in "conspiracy prosecutions involv[ing] ... allegations of multilayered 
conduct as to time and place." United States v. Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1377, 1385 (1992) (prosecution 
for conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine following prior conviction for actual manufac-
ture of the drug). Nonetheless, this Note analyzes CCE and conspiracy under the traditional 
lesser-included analysis. Initially, the Court has followed the traditional lesser-included analysis 
when analyzing the two crimes. See Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 150-51 (discussing lesser-included of-
fense analysis in a CCE and conspiracy prosecution); Garrett, 471 U.S. at 794 (affirming in dicta 
the notion that conspiracy is a lesser-included offense within CCE). Second, the Felix Court's 
mode of analysis is inapposite to the multiple punishment inquiry in this Note. Felix did not 
involve the CCE statute. Moreover, Felix raised a subsequent prosecution claim rather than a 
multiple punishment claim. See 112 S. Ct. at 1380. The Court's holding in Jeffers, later upheld 
in Garrett, that Congress did not intend to punish CCE and conspiracy cumulatively, is intact. 
Finally, while conspiracy and a substantive crime are generally separate offenses, conspiracy usu-
ally is a lesser-included offense of a crime involving concerted criminal activity. Iannelli v. 
United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 (1975). This notion has been termed "Wharton's Rule." In 
Iannelli, the Court discussed the operation of Wharton's Rule: 
Wharton's Rule applies only to offenses that require concerted criminal activity, a plural-
ity of criminal agents. In such cases, a closer relationship exists between the conspiracy and 
the substantive offense because both require collective criminal activity. The substantive 
offense therefore presents some of the same threats that the law of conspiracy normally is 
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structure, and legislative history of [the Act] show in the plainest way 
that Congress intended the CCE provision to be a separate criminal 
offense which [is] punishable in addition to, and not as a substitute for, 
the predicate offenses."100 The Court issued a limited holding compat-
ible with Jeffers - that Congress had authorized cumulative punish-
ment for "substantive predicate offenses."101 But the Court's 
conclusion that substantive predicate offenses are not lesser-included 
offenses within CCE undermined Jeffers. The Jeffers Court's assump-
tion that conspiracy constitutes an offense included within CCE re-
mained intact, however, because the Garrett majority recognized that 
Jeffers "reasonably concluded that the dangers posed by a conspiracy 
and a CCE were similar and thus there would be little purpose in cu-
mulating the penalties."102 
The Supreme Court's decisions regarding double jeopardy and 
CCE have not provided lower federal courts with clear guidance to 
resolve multiple punishment claims. Under Garrett, the government 
can punish defendants cumulatively for CCE and substantive narcot-
ics offenses - that is, the actual importation, manufacture, or distri-
bution of controlled substances. The Court has not resolved other 
multiple punishment issues, however. For instance, the Jeffers Court 
declined to decide whether conspiracy is a lesser-included offense 
within CCE. While Garrett followed in dicta the Jeffers Court's as-
sumption that CCE encompasses conspiracy, the issue remains open. 
Moreover, Jeffers raised other issues. The Court only reduced Jeffers' 
fine and did not touch his concurrent prison sentences. The Court 
also declined to discuss Jeffers' simultaneous convictions, although 
Ball, decided eight years later, appears to require the vacation of 
lesser-included convictions. Lower courts must decide whether this 
portion of Jeffers is still viable after Ball. The next Part examines the 
results of several years of struggle among the federal courts to answer 
these questions. Not surprisingly, the circuit courts of appeals have 
generated varying responses to excessive punishment claims advanced 
by defendants convicted of both conspiracy and CCE. 
thought to guard against, and it cannot automatically be assumed that the Legislature in-
tended the conspiracy and the substantive offense to remain as discrete crimes upon consum-
mation of the latter. Thus, absent legislative intent to the contrary, the Rule supports a 
presumpti'on that the two merge when the substantive offense is proved. 
420 U.S. at 785-86 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Wharton's Rule is applicable to com-
plex statutory crimes. See Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 147-51. Wharton's Rule and lesser-included anal-
ysis thus control if continuing criminal enterprise requires proof of concerted activity and 
Congress has not authorized cumulative punishment. See infra text accompanying notes 170-78. 
100. 471 U.S. at 779. 
101. 471 U.S. at 794 (emphasis added). 
102. 471 U.S. at 794; see also United States v. Maza, 983 F.2d 1004, 1009 (11th Cir. 1993) 
("These decisions [holding conspiracy to be included within the definition of CCE] were not 
disturbed by the Supreme Court's ruling in Garrett ... that the substantive, predicate offenses, as 
distinguished from conspiracy, were not lesser-included offenses of CCE for purposes of double 
jeopardy.") (footnote omitted). 
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II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS' TREATMENT OF CCE AND 
CONSPIRACY UNDER THE MULTIPLE PUNISHMENT DOCTRINE 
Part I concluded that the Supreme Court's treatment of multiple 
punishment claims involving CCE and conspiracy has shrouded the 
parameters of the Multiple Punishment Doctrine. The courts of ap-
peals differ in their responses to the Court's unsettled jurisprudence. 
This Part examines several methods for dealing with multiple convic-
tions for CCE and conspiracy. Section II.A analyzes the approach 
advocated by a majority of courts, which vacate both separate convic-
tions and sentences imposed for conspiracy. Section II.B reviews three 
competing doctrines - the Second Circuit's combination approach, 
the Third Circuit's retention of separate convictions without sen-
tences, and the Seventh Circuit's allowance of both convictions and 
concurrent sentences for conspiracy. 
A. The Majority Rule - Vacating Convictions and Sentences 
A majority of the circuit courts of appeals have concluded that 
allowing the conviction of a defendant for conspiracy in addition to 
CCE violates the Multiple Punishment Doctrine. 103 The circuits ad-
hering to the majority "vacation" rule can be separated into two 
camps. Some of the circuits reason that Jeffers v. United States104 pro-
hibits cumulative punishment for CCE and conspiracy, believing that 
the Jeffers Court held that conspiracy is a lesser-included offense 
within CCE. 105 Other circuits combine Jeffers with the Court's deci-
sion in Ball v. United States106 - which held that convictions for 
lesser-included offenses violate the multiple punishment bar by gener-
ating adverse collateral consequences - to invalidate conspiracy con-
victions.107 Although both approaches achieve the same result, this 
Note follows the circuits relying on Ball in analyzing the multiple pun-
ishment issue.108 
103. See, e.g., United States v. Montanye, 962 F.2d 1332, 1346-47 (8th Cir. 1992); United 
States v. David, 940 F.2d 722, 738 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2301 (1992); United 
States v. Jones, 918 F.2d 909, 910-11 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam); United States v. Rivera, 900 
F.2d 1462, 1478 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Butler, 885 F.2d 195, 201-02 (4th Cir. 1989); 
United States v. Schuster, 769 F.2d 337, 344-45 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 1021 
(1986); United States v. Smith, 703 F.2d 627, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam); United States v. 
Michel, 588 F.2d 986, 1001 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 825 (1979). 
104. 432 U.S. 137 (1977). 
105. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text. 
106. 470 U.S. 856 (1985). 
107. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
108. See infra notes 184-98 and accompanying text. 
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The District of Columbia, 109 Fourth, 110 Fifth, 111 Tenth, 112 and 
Eleventh 113 Circuits, although joining in the majority result, have 
conducted only a cursory examination of the Multiple Punishment 
Doctrine and concluded that a defendant cannot be punished 
for both greater- and lesser-included offenses. These circuits 
simply assume that Jeffers held that CCE and conspiracy cannot 
be punished simultaneously.114 This assumption is simply wrong; 
Jeffers reserved for decision the issue of whether the narcotics con-
spiracy and CCE statutes overlap.115 Moreover, as one court has 
109. United States v. Smith, 703 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam). 
110. United States v. Butler, 885 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1989); see also United States v. Lyles, 
No. 91-6278, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 5529, at *1-3 (4th Cir. Apr. 5, 1991) (per curiam). Before 
Butler, the Fourth Circuit adhered to the view espoused by the Third Circuit and allowed con-
spiracy convictions to stand but vacated conspiracy sentences. See, e.g., United States v. West, 
877 F.2d 281, 292 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989); United States v. Porter, 821 F.2d 
968, 978 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 934 (1988). Since the decision in Butler, one 
district court attempted to adopt the Second Circuit's "combination" doctrine, which merges the 
conspiracy convictions into the CCE conviction to guarantee that a felon is punished in the event 
that the CCE conviction is later vacated on appeal. See United States v. Fuentes, 729 F. Supp. 
487, 491-93 (E.D. Va. 1989). The Fourth Circuit, acknowledging that it had given "mixed sig-
nals" on the issue, thwarted the district court's attempt and held simply that Butler was control-
ling. United States v. Tanner, No. 89-5237, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 19956, at *15-18 (4th Cir. 
Nov. 9, 1990) (per curiam), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1397 (1991). 
111. United States v. Michel, 588 F.2d 986 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 825 (1979). 
112. United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1478 (10th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. 
Stallings, 810 F.2d 973, 975-76 (10th Cir. 1987). One panel in the Tenth Circuit attempted to 
adopt the combination approach heralded by the Second Circuit. See United States v. Staggs, 
881 F.2d 1546, 1548 (10th Cir. 1989). The decision has apparently been ignored in subsequent 
cases, however. See Rivera, 900 F.2d at 1478. 
113. United States v. Jones, 918 F.2d 909 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam). Two panels in the 
Eleventh Circuit have vacated conspiracy convictions on appeal and noted that those convictions 
are "merged" into the CCE conviction. E.g., United States v. Alvarez-Moreno, 874 F.2d 1402, 
1414 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1032 (1990); United States v. Brantley, 733 F.2d 
1429, 1436 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1006 (1985). Though this language replicates 
the phrasing used by those circuits adhering to the "combination approach," the Eleventh Cir-
cuit has not referred to the possibility that the conspiracy convictions might be resurrected to 
justify a defendant's incarceration upon reversal of a CCE count. The courts are apparently 
referring to the presumption - labeled Wharton's Rule - that a conspiracy offense merges with 
the substantive offense for sentencing purposes when the conspiracy is a lesser-included offense. 
See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785-86 (1975). Hence, this Note presumes that the 
Eleventh Circuit has not adopted the combination method. 
114. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 918 F.2d 909, 910 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) ("The 
Supreme Court ... [has] held that when a conspiracy serves as a predicate act for a CCE convic-
tion based upon the same criminal agreement, the conspiracy conviction merges into the CCE 
conviction.") (citing Jeffers); United States v. Porter, 821 F.2d 968, 978 (4th Cir. 1987) ("Con-
gress did not intend that an individual be punished under both § 846 (conspiracy) and § 848 
(continuing criminal enterprise).") (citing Jeffers), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 934 (1988); United 
States v. Michel, 588 F.2d 986, 1001 (5th Cir.) ("Because conspiracy ... is a lesser-included 
offense to conducting a continuing criminal enterprise, it cannot support a separate conviction 
and sentence.") (citing Jeffers), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 825 (1979). 
115. Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 153 n.20; see also United States v. Maza, 9.83 F.2d 1004, 1009 n.9 
(11th Cir. 1993) ("Jeffers cannot be cited as holding that[§] 846 is a lesser-included offense of the 
CCE [offense] because this was not necessary to its decision."); United States v. Aguilar, 849 
F.2d 92, 98 (3d Cir. 1988) ("Although many courts have assumed otherwise, often relying on 
concessions to this effect by the government, we believe that Jeffers quite clearly did not hold 
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argued, 116 Jeffers allowed the imposition of concurrent sentences so 
long as the cumulative punishment did not exceed the statutory maxi-
mum.117 Because Jeffers had been sentenced to life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole, the Court let stand his concurrent 
sentence for conspiracy.118 At best, these circuits' failure to evaluate 
multiple punishment claims in a more detailed fashion undercuts the 
logical force of the decisions because ref'erence to the values underly-
ing a legal rule is often crucial in judicial decisionmaking.119 Worse, 
the reasoning utilized by these courts may w'eaken the credibility of 
the majority approach, as evinced by the difficulty which subsequent 
courts have faced in justifying precedent when confronted with the 
government's advocacy of one of the minority views. 120 
The remaining circuits adhering to the majority rule - the 
First, 121 Sixth, 122 and Eighth 123 - rely on the Supreme Court's deci-
conspiracy to be a lesser offense included within the greater crime of engaging in a CCE."), cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 962 (1990). 
116. United States v. Bond, 847 F.2d 1233, 1239 (7th Cir. 1988) ("The conclusion that con· 
current sentences may be imposed under § 846 and § 848 has the support of Jeffers, where this 
happened."). 
117. Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 156-58. 
118. 432 U.S. at 155 n.24. 
119. See supra text accompanying note 29. 
120. See, e.g., Tanner, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 19956, at *17 (responding to an argument 
urging adoption of the Second Circuit's "combination" approach without attempting to justify 
Fourth Circuit precedent). 
121. United States v. David, 940 F.2d 722, 738-39 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2301 
(1991); see also United States v. Cloutier, 966 F.2d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Abreu, 
952 F.2d 1458, 1464-65 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1695 (1992); United States v. Rivera· 
. Martinez, 931 F.2d 148, 152-53 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 184 (1991); Restrepo v. United 
States, 761 F. Supp. 211, 213-16 (D. Mass. 1991). 
In Cloutier, the district court seemingly adopted the Second Circuit's combination approach 
at the urging of the government. See Cloutier, 966 F.2d at 27 ("The [district] court agreed with 
the government and merged the conspiracy and CCE sentences into one, so that there were two 
convictions and one sentence for the two counts."). The circuit court avoided the question "of 
whether the [district] court erred in merging the conspiracy and CCE counts,'' leaving that issue 
"for another day." 966 F.2d at 30-31. 
122. United States v. Schuster, 769 F.2d 337, 343-45 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 
1021 (1986). The Schuster court actually instructed the trial court to vacate the conspiracy con· 
victions and "merge them into the continuing criminal enterprise offense." 769 F.2d at 345. The 
court then cryptically added that the merger would "have limited effect on the sentence imposed 
under section 848 [CCE], for there was no consecutive time or fine imposed under the conspiracy 
charges." 769 F.2d at 345. The court did not clarify whether it was attempting to preserve the 
conspiracy convictions for resuscitation or simply noting that conspiracy is a lesser-included 
offense. See supra note 113. 
Two subsequent decisions in the Sixth Circuit shed little light on the issue. In United States 
v. Paulino, 935 F.2d 739 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 315 (1991), the panel remanded the 
case to the trial court for vacation of the conspiracy conviction without reference to a "merger" 
of the two counts. 935 F.2d at 751. A subsequent decision by the Sixth Circuit alluded to 
merging conspiracy and CCE convictions but did not direct the trial court to do so. Rather, the 
court of appeals remanded the case to allow the trial court to choose which conviction to retain, 
since an anomaly in the sentencing guidelines made the defendant's sentence higher for conspir-
acy than for CCE. United States v. Chambers, 944 F.2d 1253, 1268-69 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1217 (1992). 
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sion in Ball v. United States124 for the conclusion that concurrent 
lesser-included convictions violate the multiple punishment bar. 125 
These circuits combine the implication of Jeffers - that conspiracy is 
a lesser-included offense within CCE - with the holding in Ball that 
convictions for lesser-included offenses entail adverse collateral conse-
quences offensive to the Multiple Punishment Doctrine.126 These cir-
cuits recognize that lesser-included conspiracy convictions result in 
double punishment because they may enhance subsequent sentences 
under recidivist statutes or be used to impeach trial testimony.w 
While other courts have questioned the doctrinal merit of the vacation 
approach, 128 the majority rule circuits resting on both Jeffers and Ball 
have successfully defended their analysis against the minority views. 
B. Minority Approaches 
Four circuits have concluded that relevant precedent does not re-
quire the elimination of convictions or sentences for conspiracy when 
a defendant faces punishment for engaging in a continuing criminal 
enterprise. The Second and Ninth Circuits adhere to the view· that 
"combining" conspiracy and CCE convictions into one conviction 
mitigates any cumulative punishment concerns. The Third Circuit ar-
gues that retaining convictions for both CCE and conspiracy, while 
vacating conspiracy sentences, is consistent with the Multiple Punish-
ment Doctrine. Finally, the Seventh Circuit perceives the additional 
punishment imposed by the retention of concurrent sentences to be 
consistent with that authorized by the Court and Congress. 
1. The Combination Approach 
The Second Circuit has proposed a unique alternative to the ma-
jority rule. Rather than vacating a defendant's conspiracy convic-
123. United States v. Montanye, 962 F.2d 1332, 1346-47 (8th Cir. 1992); see also United 
States v. Holt, 969 F.2d 685, 687 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Duke, 940 F.2d 1113, 1120 
(8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Possick, 849 F.2d 332, 341 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. 
Grubbs, 829 F.2d 18, 19 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Maull, 806 F.2d 1340, 1346-47 (8th 
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 907 (1987). 
124. 470 U.S. 856 (1985). 
125. See, e.g., Duke, 940 F.2d at 1120 ("[T]he Court has made it clear that the second con-
viction and not merely the second sentence violates the [D]ouble [J]eopardy [C]lause.") (citing 
Ball); Rivera-Martinez, 931 F.2d at 148 ("Ball . .. serves as our polestar."); Schuster, 169 F.2d at 
344 ("Because the CCE and conspiracy charges are not subject to double punishment, the [con-
spiracy convictions] must be vacated.") (citing Ball). 
126. See, e.g., Duke, 940 F.2d at 1120; Rivera-Martinez, 931 F.2d at 152-53; Schuster, 169 
F.2d at 344-45. 
127. See supra text accompanying notes 50-62. 
128. See United States v. Fernandez, 916 F.2d 125, 128-29 (3d Cir. 1990) (arguing that the 
majority rule "frustrates ... [c]ongressional intent and is surely not required by the [D]ouble 
[J]eopardy [C]lause"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2249 (1991); United States v. Bond, 847 F.2d 1233, 
1239 (7th Cir. 1988) (rejecting majority rule because Jeffers permits concurrent sentencing "pro-
vided [that] the cumulative punishment does not exceed the maximum under the CCE Act"). 
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tions, the Second Circuit advocates "combining" those charges with 
the CCE count so that only one conviction remains.129 If an appellate 
court then reverses a defendant's continuing criminal enterprise con-
viction, the court will automatically reinstate the conspiracy convic-
tions so that the defendant will not elude punishment.13o 
Although some circuits reject the Second Circuit's rule, 131 the 
Ninth Circuit recently has adopted the "combination approach."132 
The Ninth Circuit had been the most haphazard jurisdiction in this 
area, having implici~ly reversed its stance twice. The Ninth Circuit 
initially viewed only conspiracy sentences imposed consecutively to a 
CCE sentence as offensive to the prohibition against cumulative pun-
ishment.133 Following the Supreme Court's decision in Ball, however, 
another panel in the circuit concluded that even concurrent sentences 
"constitute[] cumulative punishment."134 A few years later another 
panel again altered the circuit's doctrinal approach to the multiple 
punishment problem. In United States v. Medina, 135 the court noted 
that the majority rule places district courts "in a bind"136 because it 
requires a sentencing judge to vacate otherwise valid convictions de-
spite the potential reversal of the CCE conviction.137 The court con-
cluded that authorizing district court judges to sentence in the 
alternative presents a "more efficient course."138 Hence, if an appel-
late court reverses the CCE charge, "the conviction and sentence on 
the lesser-included counts will be effective and subject to the same ap-
peal," avoiding "needless remand."139 Although the Ninth Circuit 
seems to have joined forces with the Second Circuit, 140 it has done so 
129. See United States v. Aiello, 771 F.2d 621, 632-35 (2d Cir. 1985); see also United States 
v. Benevento, 836 F.2d 60, 73 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1043 (1988); United States v. 
Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 383-84 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1021 (1988); United States v. 
Osorio Estrada, 751 F.2d 128, 134-35 (2d Cir. 1984), modified on other grounds, 151 F.2d 27 (2d 
Cir.), and cert. denied, 474 U.S. 830 (1985). 
130. Aiello, 171 F.2d at 634 n.6 ("[l]f the conviction of the greater offense were eventually to 
be overturned, our practice would, by design, resuscitate the lesser conviction and thereby ensure 
that the defendant would not avoid punishment .... "). 
131. See United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 931 F.2d 148, 152-53 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 
S. Ct. 184 (1991); United States v. Tanner, No. 89-5237, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 19956, at *17-18 
(4th Cir. Nov. 9, 1990), modifyingpercuriam United States v. Fuentes, 729 F. Supp. 487, 492-93 
(E.D. Va. 1989) (adopting the combination approach), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1397 (1991); 
Restrepo v. United States, 761 F. Supp. 211, 216-17 (D. Mass. 1991). 
132. United States v. Medina, 940 F.2d 1247, 1253 (9th Cir. 1991). 
133. See United States v. Burt, 765 F.2d 1364, 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1985). 
134. United States v. Hernandez-Escarsega, 886 F.2d 1560, 1582 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. de-
nied, 491 U.S. 1003 (1990). 
135. 940 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1991). 
136. 940 F.2d at 1253. 
137. 940 F.2d at 1253. 
138. 940 F.2d at 1253. 
139. 940 F.2d at 1253. 
140. See supra text accompanying notes 129-30 (describing the Second Circuit's adherence to 
the combination approach). 
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without officially recognizing the alliance.141 
Courts advocating the "combination approach" have identified 
three reasons for doing so. First, the merging of separate convictions 
into a single count averts adverse collateral consequences from the 
conspiracy charges.· As only one conviction remains following the 
merger, the conspiracy convictions will not harm a defendant in a col-
lateral manner. 142 Additionally, "the reactivation of the lesser convic-
tion facilitates the congressional'purpose of ensuring that a defendant 
is punished for whatever degree of a crime he is adjudged to be guilty 
of having committed."143 Finally, as Medina recognized, merging the 
conspiracy and CCE convictions reduces a potential burden on judi-
cial resources. The "combination approach" eliminates the need to 
remand a case for vacation of the conspiracy convictions, because 
when the CCE count is affirmed, "the vacation will have been accom-
plished automatically."144 
2. Permitting Simultaneous Convictions 
The Third Circuit allows the retention of both CCE and conspir-
acy convictions while requiring the vacation of sentences received for 
the lesser-included conspiracy charges. In United States v. Grayson, 145 
the court identified conspiracy as a lesser-included offense within CCE 
and recognized that imposing punishments for both crimes would vio-
141. The Medina court did not cite any Second Circuit cases in adopting the combination 
method. See 940 F.2d at 1253. 
142. E.g., United States v. Aiello, 771 F.2d 621, 633 (2d Cir. 1985) ("A combined lesser 
conviction could not properly be considered, for instance, in determining a defendant's eligibility 
for parole, in sentencing him in the future under a recidivist statute or impeaching his credibility 
at a later trial."); United States v. Fuentes, 729 F. Supp. 487, 493 (E.D. Va. 1989) (combining 
convictions avoids cumulative punishment), modified per curiam sub nom. United States v. Tan-
ner, 917 F.2d 1302 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1397 (1991). 
143. Aiello, 771 F.2d at 634; see also Fuentes, 729 F. Supp. at 493 (merging convictions 
"minimizes the risk that [a] defendant's criminal conduct will go unpunished"); cf. Medina, 940 
F.2d at 1253 (majority rule leaves courts "powerless to reinstate the potentially valid lesser-
included counts of conviction"). The Aiello court concluded that there is "no practical difference 
between [Ball's] prescription to vacate a conviction and our practice of 'combining' a lesser con-
viction into a conviction on the greater offense." 771 F.2d at 634 n.6. The Fuentes court 
weighed the relative interests involved, concluding that "[a]ny inherent punitive effect flowing 
from the continuing existence of the merged lesser-included offense conviction ... is outweighed 
by the interest in ensuring that those convicted of serious crimes do not unjustifiably escape 
punishment." 729 F. Supp. at 493. 
144. 940 F.2d at 1253. For a full critique of this argument, see infra section 111.C. At a 
minimum, in the event that an appellate court reverses a CCE conviction, a remand will be 
necessary to determine the defendant's sentence for conspiracy. The defendant will not have 
been sentenced for the resuscitated conviction, a condition necessary to justify the continued 
incarceration of the defendant. For example, appellate courts exercising the inherent power to 
impose a conviction for a lesser-included offense when reversing a conviction for a greater offense 
must remand the case for sentencing. See, e.g., United States v. Plenty Arrows, 946 F.2d 62, 67 
(8th Cir. 1991) (remanding case for resentencing upon imposing a conviction on a lesser-included 
offense). 
145. 795 F.2d 278 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1018 (1987). 
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late the prohibition on multiple punishment. 146 The panel concluded 
that, "since it is the 'cumulation of sentence' which is illegal, we are 
not required to vacate [the conspiracy and CCE] convictions."147 The 
Third Circuit justified its rejection of the majority rule in United States 
v. Fernandez. 148 Fernandez challenged the district court's refusal to 
expunge his conspiracy convictions, relying on the Supreme Court's 
decision in Ball 149 Rejecting Fernandez' plea to adopt the majority 
approach, the Third Circuit maintained that "the narcotics conspiracy 
statutes of which Fernandez was convicted and the continuing crimi-
nal enterprise statute have different purposes."150 
The Third Circuit has offered two justifications for retaining con-
spiracy convictions when a defendant is also convicted of engaging in a 
continuing criminal enterprise. First, the Third Circuit divines con-
gressional intent "that predicate conspiracy and continuing criminal 
enterprise convictions may stand,"151 thereby justifying any collateral 
consequences generated by the retention of separate convictions. 152 
Moreover, the Third Circuit argues that simultaneous convictions 
serve society's interest in ensuring that the guilty do not escape pun-
ishment, because upon reversal of the CCE count the government can 
rely upon the conspiracy convictions to justify a defendant's 
incarceration.153 
3. Allowing Convictions and Concurrent Sentences 
The Seventh Circuit has held that not only is retention of separate 
convictions for conspiracy permissible, but imposing sentences for 
those offenses is also constitutional so long as the cumulative punish-
146. 795 F.2d at 287 (citing Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 794 (1985)). 
147. 795 F.2d at 287. A subsequent opinion appears to repudiate the reasoning contained in 
Grayson. In United States v. Aguilar, 849 F.2d 92 (3d Cir. 1988), the Third Circuit reversed the 
CCE conviction of a prisoner who had previously pied guilty to conspiracy. After designating 
conspiracy as a lesser-included offense of CCE, the court reasoned that "the proper remedy ••• is 
to reverse [the] CCE conviction, and not simply to vacate the sentence •.• received for that 
conviction." 849 F.2d at 96 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988), and cert. denied, 498 
U.S. 962 (1980). Aguilar did not overrule Grayson, however, because the court cautioned that its 
decision was "not concerned with the [D]ouble [J]eopardy [C]lause's protection against multiple 
punishments." 849 F.2d at 99. 
148. 916 F.2d 125 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2249 (1991). 
149. 916 F.2d at 126. 
150. 916 F.2d at 127. Compare Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 156 ("[s]ection 848 itself reflects a com-
prehensive penalty structure that leaves little opportunity for pyramiding of penalties") with Gar-
rett, 471 U.S. at 794 ("the dangers posed by a conspiracy and a CCE [are] similar and thus there 
would be little purpose in cumulating the penalties"). 
151. 916 F.2d at 128. The Fernandez court also opined that any collateral consequences 
flowing from the conspiracy convictions would not be "additional punishment" since the "same 
consequences" would naturally result from the initial CCE conviction. 916 F.2d at 128. This 
argument seemingly misapprehends the concept of adverse collateral consequences as explained 
in Ball. See infra notes 205-06 and accompanying text. 
152. See 916 F.2d at 128-29. 
153. Fernandez, 916 F.2d at 127-28. 
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ment does not exceed the maximum authorized by the CCE statute.154 
In United States v. Bond, 155 the court concluded that this approach 
comports with the Supreme Court's pronouncements regarding multi-
ple punishment.156 The Bond court argued that Congress had author-
ized these concurrent sentences: "It is not illogical to convict a person 
both of agreeing to do something [conspiracy] and succeeding on a 
grand scale [operating a continuing criminal enterprise]."157 Addi-
tionally, Bond stressed that the Supreme Court in Jeffers upheld con-
current sentences on appeal, 158 which the Bond court interpreted as a 
confirmation that the retention of separate sentences is constitutionally 
permissible.159 Finally, Bond rejected the notion that adverse collat-
eral consequences might attach to conspiracy convictions, as "the un-
availability of parole on the CCE conviction ensures that the 
multiplication of convictions does not count against the defendant at 
parole time."160 
The advantages of the Seventh Circuit's method of dealing with 
conspiracy and CCE are nearly identical to the "combination" ap-
proach advocated by the Second and Ninth Circuits. First, the reten-
tion of conspiracy convictions allows the government to continue to 
154. This caveat creates minimal protection for the criminal defendant, as 21 U.S.C. § 848(b) 
& (d) allows a person convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise to be sentenced to 
life in prison without possibility of parole. 
155. 847 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1988). 
156. Bond overruled sub silentio United States v. Jefferson, 714 F.2d 689, 703-06 (7th Cir. 
1983), which required the vacation of convictions and sentences received for conspiracy when a 
defendant has also been convicted of operating a CCE. See United States v. Bafia, 949 F.2d 1465, 
1472-1473 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1989 (1992). For an account of "the rather 
confusing progression of Jefferson ... and its subsequent history,'' see Bafia, 949 F.2d at 1472-73. 
Bond's method of decisionmaking has been criticized within the circuit. See United States v. 
Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 754 (7th Cir. 1988) (reluctantly adhering to Bond because of stare 
decisis), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 908 (1989). Bond has also been eroded. In United States v. Alva-
rez, 860 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1051 (1989), a different panel in the 
Seventh Circuit remanded a case for resentencing even though the trial court had imposed con-
current sentences in accordance with Bond. The court highlighted the "distinct possibility that 
the district court may have considered [the defendant's] guilt on the conspiracy conviction in 
sentencing him on the CCE conviction." 860 F.2d at 830. The court evaded Bond by suggesting 
that long CCE sentences might be presumptively invalid under Jeffers when a defendant has also 
been sentenced on conspiracy charges. 860 F.2d at 830 n.31; see also Bafia, 942 F.2d at 1474 ("it 
seems clear that the [defendant's] conspiracy sentence affected the CCE sentence in clear viola-
tion of Alvarez"); United States v. Pace, 898 F.2d 1218, 1238 (7th Cir. 1990) (sentencing judge 
"may not take the conspiracy conviction into account when sentencing ... on the CCE count"). 
But see United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928, 949 (7th Cir. 1991) (upholding 26-year concur-
rent terms for CCE and conspiracy because the "cumulative punishment clearly does not exceed 
the maximum allowable under the CCE conviction"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1940 (1992). 
157. 847 F.2d at 1238. The Seventh Circuit's reading of both Supreme Court precedent and 
congressional intent appears to suffer from the same deficiencies as the Third Circuit's approach. 
See infra text accompanying notes 212-18. 
158. See supra text accompanying note 92. 
159. 847 F.2d at 1239. 
160. 847 F.2d at 1239. This argument ignores the potential for multiple convictions to affect 
collaterally a defendant's sentence under a recidivist statute, as well as the possibility for im-
peachment, identified by the Supreme Court in Ball. See infra section 111.B. 
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incarcerate a prisoner who successfully challenges a CCE conviction 
but remains guilty of conspiracy. 161 Furthermore, the Seventh Cir-
cuit's approach avoids needless remands and thereby conserves judi-
cial resources. If an appellate court reverses a CCE conviction, the 
conspiracy conviction remains intact, while the same result "would 
require extra motion if the [conspiracy] sentences had to be vacated 
... and resurrected at some future time."162 
To summarize, the circuit courts of appeals have announced four 
differing interpretations of the Supreme Court's pronouncements on 
multiple punishment in the realm of CCE and conspiracy: vacating 
conspiracy convictions, combining conspiracy convictions with the 
CCE conviction, permitting simultaneous convictions without 
sentences, and allowing both simultaneous convictions and concurrent 
sentences. Each approach claims the support of Supreme Court prece-
dent. The analysis in the next Part, however, concludes that only the 
majority vacation approach comports with the Court's pronounce-
ments in Jeffers and Garrett and also eliminates the potential for mul-
tiple punishment through adverse collateral consequences. 
III . .APPLYING THE MULTIPLE PUNISHMENT FRAMEWORK TO 
THE CIRCUITS' APPROACHES 
This Part scrutinizes the interaction between continuing criminal 
enterprise and conspiracy, utilizing the test for Multiple Punishment 
Doctrine violations outlined in Part I. Section III.A analyzes the two 
crimes from the standpoint of established cumulative punishment ju-
risprudence and argues that the minority approaches that impose con-
current convictions or sentences for the two offenses stray from 
Supreme Court precedent. Section III.B more specifically examines 
the approaches generated by the Third and Seventh Circuits and re-
jects them as being inconsistent with the multiple punishment bar. 
Section IIl.C compares the vacation approach with the combination 
method and argues that the vacation approach alone is consistent with 
the Multiple Punishment Doctrine. This Part concludes that the vaca-
tion approach advocated by a majority of the courts of appeals best 
addresses the issue of cumulative punishment. 
A. CCE and Conspiracy Under the Two-Step Inquiry 
Part I outlined the Supreme Court's two-step analysis of cumula-
tive punishment claims. 163 In order to establish a Multiple Punish-
161. 847 F.2d at 1238. 
162. 847 F.2d at 1238-39. The Seventh Circuit approach appears to avoid some of the diffi-
culty inherent in the "combination" approach in this respect. An appellate court reversing a 
CCE conviction will not need to remand the case to the trial court to impose sentence on the 
remaining conspiracy counts if concurrent sentences are imposed. See supra note 144. 
163. See supra text accompanying notes 67-78. 
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ment Doctrine violation, a defendant must prove that the two offenses 
are "the same" - that is, that one offense is necessarily included 
within the definition of the other - and that Congress has not clearly 
authorized punishment for the two offenses. This Note posits that 
conspiracy is a lesser-included offense within CCE; thus, the offenses 
are "the same" for the purposes of multiple punishment inspection.164 
The first step in the multiple punishment inquiry is to examine the 
nexus between the CCE and·conspiracy statutes to determine whether 
the offenses are the same under the Blockburger test. 165 The two 
crimes clearly overlap under the test. Initially, the statutes describe 
identical offenses. By satisfying the requirements of the CCE statute, 
the government will necessarily prove that a defendant conspired to 
violate narcotics laws. The CCE statute directs the prosecutor to es-
tablish that a defendant has committed a series of violations of the 
narcotics laws166 "in concert with five or more other persons."167 
Proof that a defendant acted in concert with at least five other individ-
uals in the course of his criminal activities will involve evidence of at 
least one conspiracy.168 In order to demonstrate that a defendant has 
conspired to violate the narcotics laws, a prosecutor therefore need not 
offer any proof independent of that required by the CCE statute. 
Moreover, courts uniformly agree that conspiracy is indeed a 
lesser-included offense within the CCE statute. The Court in Jeffers, 
while not prepared to declare definitively the two offenses to be the 
same for double jeopardy purposes, 169 did note that "the phrase 'in 
concert' . . . has generally connoted cooperative action and agree-
164. As previously noted, the Supreme Court has repudiated somewhat the lesser-included 
offense test in the context of complex prosecutions involving "multilayered conduct." United 
States v. Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1377, 1385 (1992); see also Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 789 
(1985). In Felix. however, the Court merely reaffirmed the general rule (noted in Garrett) that 
"conspiracy to commit an offense and the offense itself . . . are separate offenses for double 
jeopardy purposes." 112 S. Ct. at 1385. This type of analysis is inappropriate when conspiracy is 
an element of a "substantive" offense. Wharton's Rule creates "an exception to the general prin-
ciple that a conspiracy and the substantive offense that is its immediate end are discrete crimes 
for which separate sanctions may be imposed." Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 771 
(1975). See supra note 99. 
165. This Note analyzes the CCE and conspiracy offenses under the Blockburger rule rather 
than relying on the assumption in Jeffers that the crimes are identical, as some majority-rule 
jurisdictions have done. See supra text accompanying notes 109-20. 
166. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2) (1988). 
167. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2)(A) (1988). 
168. The government may choose to rely on substantive offenses (that is, actual importation 
and distribution) rather than conspkacy to establish the "series of violations" required by 21 
U.S.C. § 848(c)(2). The prosecutorial strategy in such an instance will not obviate the need for 
proof of conspiracy, however. The government would have to establish that the substantive 
predicate offenses were masterminded by the defendant in coordination with at least five persons, 
which necessarily involves evidence of conspiratorial conduct. See Jeffers v. United States, 432 
U.S. 137, 148 (1977) ("Even if § 848 were read to require individual agreements between the 
leader of the enterprise and each of the other five necessary participants, enough would be shown 
to prove a conspiracy."). 
169. Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 153 n.20. 
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ment."170 The Court would probably be unwilling to renounce the 
assumption given that its interpretation in Jeffers comports with the 
generally accepted meaning of the term. Indeed, the Court's subse-
quent admonition in Garrett that the "dangers posed by a conspiracy 
and CCE [are] similar"171 confirms the view that courts should regard 
conspiracy as a lesser-included offense of CCE. Finally, the circuit 
courts of appeals unanimously view conspiracy and CCE as lesser and 
greater offenses. 112 
The second step in a multiple punishment inquiry - inspecting 
legislative intent for authority to cumulate punishments - compels 
the conclusion that Congress intended to punish either CCE or con-
spiracy but not both. A survey of the structure and history of the con-
tinuing criminal enterprise statute does not indicate that Congress has 
"clear[ly]"173 and "specially"174 condoned punishment for conspiring 
to violate narcotics laws and engaging in a CCE. The CCE statute 
"reflects a comprehensive penalty structure that leaves little opportu-
nity for pyramiding of penalties."175 The legislative history of the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 sup-
ports a similar conclusion. Congress intended penalties for violations 
of the Act to vary with the dangerousness of the narcotics involved, 
"[e]xcept when continuing criminal enterprises serve as the basis for 
an indictment."176 This language suggests that the judiciary should 
consider the penalties as exclusive rather than cumulative;177 a convic-
tion under the CCE statute should bar other criminal liability based on 
the same conduct. The Supreme Court has accepted this conclu-
sion.178 Thus, while "[i]t is not illogical to convict a person of both 
agreeing to do something [conspiracy] and succeeding on a grand scale 
[by operating a continuing criminal enterprise],"179 the CCE statute, 
by its terms, already does so.180 Moreover, one must view congres-
170. 432 U.S. at 149 n.14. 
171. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 794 (1985). 
172. See United States v. Aguilar, 849 F.2d 92, 98 n.11 (3d Cir. 1988) (collecting cases), cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 962 (1990). 
173. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 692 (1980). 
174. Whalen, 445 U.S. at 693; see also Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368 (1983) (Con· 
gress must "specifically authorize[] cumulative punishment"); Albernaz v. United States, 450 
U.S. 333, 340 (1981) (Blockburger rule of statutory construction is controlling absent "a clear 
indication of contrary legislative intent"). 
175. Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 156 (1977). 
176. H.R. REP. No. 1444, supra note l, pt. 1, at 10, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 
4576 (emphasis added). 
177. See Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 156 n.26. 
178. See Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 157 ("[T]he reason for separate penalties for conspiracies lies in 
the additional dangers posed by concerted activity. Section 848, however, already expressly pro-
hibits this kind of conduct."); see also Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. at 774 (1985). 
179. United States v. Bond, 847 F.2d 1233, 1238 (7th Cir. 1988). 
180. See Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 156-57 ("The policy reasons usually offered to justify separate 
punishment of conspiracies and underlying substantive offenses, however, are inapplicable to 
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sional intent in light of the Multiple Punishment Doctrine, which op-
erates as a presumption in favor of lenity, forbidding cumulative 
punishment unless clearly authorized by the legislature.181 The evi-
dence regarding legislative authorization to cumulate the penalties for 
CCE and conspiracy is, at best, "inconclusive."182 Indeed, no court 
has marshalled evidence of congressional intent to allow cumulative 
punishment.183 
The above traditional, lesser-included analysis compels the conclu-
sion that the government may not punish CCE and conspiracy cumu-
latively. However, courts should look to the underlying protections 
afforded a criminal defendant by the Multiple Punishment Doctrine to 
complete the multiple punishment inquiry.184 Whether the protec-
tions are undermined essentially depends on the existence of adverse 
collateral consequences, which affect the criminal defendant's interest 
in finality. 185 The other interests served by the doctrine - protecting 
against prosecutorial overreaching and preserving the separation of 
powers - rest on the assumption that a defendant's sentence exceeds 
that authorized by the legislature. In the CCE and conspiracy con-
text, the question of cumulative punishment186 turns on whether col-
lateral consequences will flow from retaining convictions for the lesser-
included offense when a court convicts and sentences for operating a 
continuing criminal enterprise.181 
§§ 846 and 848."); cf. U.S.S.G., supra note 45, App. C amend. 66 background cmt. ("An adjust-
ment [for the defendant's role in a conspiracy] is not authorized because the offense level of this 
guideline [CCE] already reflects an adjustment for [his conspiratorial] role in the offense."). 
181. See generally Peter Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Govern-
ment Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. RE.v. 1001, 1026 (1980). In the context of 
crimes involving conspiratorial conduct, the Wharton's Rule preserves the presumption, de-
scribed by the Supreme Court as "an exception to the general principle that a conspiracy and the 
substantive offense that is its immediate end are discrete crimes for which separate sanctions may 
be imposed." Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 771 (1975). See supra note 99. 
182. Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 156. 
183. The courts allowing cumulative punishment have attempted to glean congressional au-
thorization from the structure of the CCE statute. This line of argument suffers from two defi-
ciencies. Initially, this contention contravenes the Supreme Court's reading of the CCE statute 
in Jeffers. See Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 155 ("[T]he first issue to be considered is whether Congress 
attempted to allow cumulative punishment for violations of§§ 846 and 848. We have concluded 
that it did not •... "). Moreover, the perceived structural symmetry of the CCE and drug 
conspiracy statutes hardly qualifies as "a clear indication of ... legislative intent" to cumulate 
punishment. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 692 (1980). 
184. See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-65 (1985). 
185. See supra text accompanying notes 46-51. 
186. This Note contends that the imposition of concurrent sentences for conspiracy convic-
tions directly punishes a criininal defendant in violation of the Multiple Punishment Doctrine. 
See infra text accompanying notes 207-13. 
187. A defendant in the position to challenge conspiracy convictions because of the potential 
for collateral consequences will inevitably encounter identical consequences from a CCE convic-
tion. The fact that such negative consequences are "not unique" to the criminal defendant con-
victed of both CCE and conspiracy was proffered by the Third Circuit in Fernandez as a reason 
for concluding that preserving conspiracy convictions does not entail multiple punishment. 
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The retention of both conspiracy and CCE convictions generates 
four adverse collateral consequences in violation of the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause. A defendant convicted both of conspiracy and engaging 
in a continuing criminal enterprise faces additional social stigma from 
each conspiracy conviction.188 Second, the lesser-included conspiracy 
convictions heighten the possibility that a person convicted for CCE 
will be impeached in a future legal proceeding. 189 A jury might not 
comprehend the significance of the fact that several convictions stem 
from the same set of events. 19° Thus, lesser-included conspiracy con-
victions might provide the basis for impeachment, which could be crit-
ical for a defendant in a future proceeding. Third, the retention of 
lesser-included conspiracy convictions may subject defendants to re-
cidivist sentencing statutes that enhance punishment based solely on 
the number of convictions on their records. 19 1 For instance, a defend-
ant might be convicted for operating a continuing criminal enterprise, 
conspiracy to import narcotics, and conspiracy to distribute narcotics. 
Though part of one coherent scheme, these convictions would qualify 
the defendant as a habitual felon in several states. 192 Finally, the re-
tention of lesser-included conspiracy convictions increases the risk 
that a defendant will endure pretrial detention pursuant to a subse-
quent arrest. 193 These consequences, however remote, exceed the pun-
ishment authorized by Congress. 194 
These adverse collateral consequences also undermine other inter-
ests that the Multiple Punishment Doctrine safeguards.195 A vindic-
tive prosecutor could easily discriminate between criminal defendants 
by charging certain defendants with multiple conspiracies, arbitrarily 
exposing them to the prospect of punishment greater than other, simi-
larly situated defendants. 196 Additionally, prosecutors may wield the 
United States v. Fernandez, 916 F.2d 125, 128 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2249 
(1991). 
There are two reasons to reject this line of reasoning. First, the concern with adverse collat· 
eral consequences remains, because a defendant convicted of greater and lesser offenses is more 
likely to face the prospect of collateral sanctions of increased severity. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 56-66. Moreover, the potential for adverse consequences presumably represents part of 
the penalty which the legislature intends when labeling certain conduct as criminal. Absent 
convincing evidence that the legislature intended those consequences to be multiplied by convic-
tions for portions of the same conduct, however, courts ought to impose punishment for the 
greater offense alone. See Ball, 470 U.S. at 864-65; see also infra text accompanying notes 207-
13. 
188. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 56 (1968). 
189. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. 
190. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 791 (1969). 
191. See supra text accompanying notes 58-62. 
192. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
193. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text. 
194. Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-65 (1985). 
195. See supra notes 30-45 and accompanying text. 
196. Cf. Note, supra note 25, at 307 ("[T]here is evidence that defendants who have gained 
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possibility of multiple conspiracy convictions to coerce individual de-
fendants into plea arrangements arbitrarily. 197 
Permitting a defendant to be convicted, sentenced, or both for con-
spiracy in addition to CCE penetrates the constitutional barrier er-
ected between the legislative and judicial branches of government. 
Absent specific authorization from the legislature to cumulate punish-
ments, allowing convictions for lesser offenses to stand goes beyond 
the scope of judicial power because those convictions invariably con-
stitute punishment in excess of the legislatively enacted statutory 
scheme. 198 
Thus, the Supreme Court's test for evaluating multiple punishment 
claims and the constitutional values underlying the prohibition on cu-
mulative punishment both suggest that conviction and sentencing for 
conspiracy in addition to CCE is inconsistent with the Multiple Pun-
ishment Doctrine. The next section examines the constitutionality of 
permitting a defendant convicted and sentenced for engaging in a CCE 
to be concurrently sentenced for conspiring to violate the narcotics 
laws. 
B. Unconstitutionality of Retaining Concurrent Convictions or 
Sentences: The Third and Seventh Circuit Approaches 
The conclusion that the Multiple Punishment Doctrine forbids cu-
mulative sentencing for CCE and conspiracy implies that the Third 
and Seventh Circuits' approaches undermine the prohibition on multi-
ple punishments. Thus, the reasons offered by the Third Circuit for 
retaining conspiracy convictions, while vacating sentences received for 
those counts, merit consideration.199 The Third Circuit, in United 
States v. Fernandez, justified the retention of conspiracy convictions by 
arguing that "[t]here is simply no indication ... that Congress did not 
intend to permit separate convictions to stand for the conspiracy and 
notoriety and those who have offended the police are frequently selected for multiple punish-
ment.") (footnotes omitted). 
197. See supra text accompanying note 33. A prosecutor may apply these incentives most 
effectively against persons entering the criminal justice system for the first time and facing both 
CCE and conspiracy charges. If the conspiracy charges do not count against the defendant, the 
person can rationally weigh the chances of conviction against the known consequences of convic-
tion, since the range of punishment would be confined to the CCE statute. However, a defendant 
facing unknown criminal sanctions from multiple conspiracy convictions might find the incentive 
to waive the exercise of his or her constitutional rights irresistible. Cf. Note, supra note 25, at 
305 & n.188. 
198. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text; cf. Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 
157 (1977) ("[The court] had no power, however, to impose on [Jeffers] a fine greater than the 
maximum permitted by § 848."). 
199. But cf. Yanik, supra note 11, at 519 (praising Third Circuit for "enunciat[ing] the rule 
that if there exists one general sentence, the length of which is limited by the statutory maximum 
allowable under the more serious offense, then there is no perversion of the double jeopardy 
concept"). 
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continuing criminal enterprise offenses."200 This conclusion both per-
verts the government's constitutionally mandated burden to establish 
congressional authorization to cumulate punishments and ignores Jef-
fers' reading of the CCE statutory scheme. Established precedent re-
quires evidence that Congress affirmatively intended to punish 
cumulatively;201 Jeffers explicitly concluded that Congress has not ex-
pressed the requisite intent in this arena. 202 Moreover, attempts to 
justify the retention of conspiracy convictions as a device for the con-
tinued incarceration of CCE offenders in the event of appellate rever-
sal of CCE convictions203 do not alter the constitutional equation. 
Although the Court has recognized a state's interest in ensuring pun-
ishment of criminals for their offenses,204 it has refused to "weigh" the 
values derived from the Double Jeopardy Clause. "[W]here the 
Double Jeopardy Clause is applicable, its sweep is absolute. There are 
no 'equities' to be balanced, for the Clause has declared a constitu-
tional policy, based on grounds that are not open to judicial examina-
tion. "205 The Third Circuit's approach should not be condoned given 
the risk of excessive punishment inherent in the retention of separate 
convictions for the two offenses. 206 
The conclusion that retaining conspiracy convictions in addition to 
a CCE conviction violates the Multiple Punishment Doctrine also ren-
ders the Seventh Circuit's approach - permitting both simultaneous 
convictions and concurrent sentences - constitutionally suspect. The 
Seventh Circuit aggravates the constitutional violation by permitting 
the imposition of concurrent sentences for conspiracy convictions. In 
United States v. Bond, 201 the court justified concurrent sentences by 
arguing that "Jeffers does not govern [as long as] the total punishment 
imposed by the district court is less than the maximum allowed by the 
CCE Act."208 Under this reasoning, no multiple punishment problem 
200. United States v. Fernandez, 916 F.2d at 125, 127 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 
2249 (1991). 
201. See, e.g., Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684 (1980). The inquiry into congressional 
authorization is stated in terms of a rebuttable presumption in favor of lenity. "Accordingly, 
where two statutory provisions proscribe the 'same offense,' they are construed not to authorize 
cumulative punishments in the absence of a clear indication of contrary legislative intent." 445 
U.S. at 692. 
202. See supra text accompanying notes 89-91; supra notes 173-83. 
203. Fernandez, 916 F.2d at 127-28. 
204. E.g., United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978) (a defendant's interest in finality 
weighs "against the public interest in insuring that justice is meted out to offenders"); Burks v. 
United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15 (1978) ("society maintains a valid concern for insuring that the 
guilty are punished"); see also Doss, supra note 37, at 1429 ("The state has an interest in insuring 
that proper punishment is imposed for a particular offense and defendant."). 
205. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. at 11 n.6. 
206. See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 865 (1985) ("Thus, the second conviction, even 
if it results in no greater sentence, is an impermissible punishment."). 
207. 847 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1988). 
208. 847 F.2d at 1239. 
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occurs if the sentencing court imposes concurrent sentences on the 
conspiracy counts for periods shorter than the sentence imposed for 
CCE. The Jeffers Court did not approve concurrent sentences but sim-
ply declined to address the issue as not ripe for adjudication.209 The 
Jeffers Court simply did not address the issue of concurrent sentences 
because the defendant was sentenced to life in prison without pa-
role. 210 Instead, Jeffers presumed that conspiracy falls within the stat-
utory definition of a CCE. 211 The extensive discussion of adverse 
collateral consequences in Ball v. United States 212 eclipses the weak 
support that the Seventh Circuit's position purports to derive from 
Jeffers. 213 
The Supreme Court's pronouncements regarding the Multiple 
Punishment Doctrine mandate dismissing the Third and Seventh Cir-
cuit approaches. The combination approach and the majority vaca-
tion approach require greater scrutiny, however, as they appear 
facially to avoid constitutional infirmity. 
209. The Jeffers Court's refusal to vacate the defendant's concurrent conspiracy sentence 
does not undermine the conclusion that Congress did not intend to cumulate punishments. The 
Court correctly noted that the issue of multiple punishment for concurrent prison terms was not 
presented, since Jeffers had been sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. 
Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 155 n.24 (1977). The Court simply argued that Jeffers 
would not suffer any additional punishment from the concurrent sentence. Because Jeffers would 
never be released, and because the existence of adverse collateral consequences presumes that the 
defendant might be made to suffer in a later criminal proceeding, Ball, 470 U.S. at 864-65, the 
issue was not in question. 
The Seventh Circuit's reading of Jeffers in Bond, 847 F.2d at 1238-39, is less persuasive than 
the interpretation offered by other circuit courts of appeals. While the Double Jeopardy Clause 
does not forbid sentencing a defendant for both CCE and conspiracy in situations resembling 
Jeffers (when the defendant has been sentenced to life without possibility of parole), the imposi-
tion of multiple sentences will normally entail collateral consequences prohibited by the Multiple 
Punishment Doctrine. See supra text accompanying notes 188-99. 
210. See Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 155 n.24 ("[S]ince [Jeffers] is not eligible for parole at any time, 
there is no need to examine the Government's argument that the prison sentences do not present 
any possibility of cumulative punishment."); see also Restrepo v. United States, 761 F. Supp. 211, 
215 (D. Mass. 1991) ("Bond is not persuasive because it appears to be founded upon a misappre-
hension of the holding in Jeffers."). The panel in Bond also read Garrett to mean that "the 
Double Jeopardy Clause does not of its own force bar separate convictions for the CCE offense 
and its predicate felonies." 847 F.2d at 1239. The Garrett Court, however, took pains to distin-
guish between its holding that cumulative punishment is permissible for predicate substantive 
offenses and the decision in Jeffers that conspiracies are lesser-included offenses within CCE. See 
Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 794-95 (1985). 
211. See Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 150 ("So construed, [conspiracy] is a lesser-included offense of 
[CCE], because § 848 requires proof of every fact necessary to show a [conspiracy] as well as 
proof of several additional elements."). 
212. 470 U.S. 856, 864-65 (1985); see also supra text accompanying notes 50-52. 
213. The Bond court asserted that allowing concurrent convictions and sentences for con-
spiracy entails "no risk of collateral consequences," because parole is not available to those found 
guilty of operating a continuing criminal enterprise. 847 F.2d at 1239. The court simply failed 
to account for the other types of adverse collateral consequences identified in Ball. See supra text 
accompanying notes 188-98. 
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C. Comparison of the Combination and Majority Approaches 
Advocates argue that both the vacation and combination methods 
avoid adverse collateral consequences.214 The vacation approach en-
sures that courts will never use conspiracy convictions as the basis for 
future sanctions against a defendant because the convictions disappear 
from the defendant's record. The combination approach arguably 
achieves the same result by merging the two convictions into one, 
while retaining the capacity to revive the conspiracy conviction upon 
reversal of the CCE conviction.21s 
Two courts have explicitly rejected the combination approach, jus-
tifying their decisions on the basis that the potential for collateral con-
sequences remains.216 Neither court, however, addressed the reasons 
underlying their conclusion.217 Careful consideration reveals two 
ways in which the combination approach may infringe on the protec-
tions guaranteed by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Initially, the combi-
nation approach cannot guarantee that no adverse collateral 
consequences will follow from the merger of the convictions because 
the presence of the conspiracy convictions on a defendant's record in-
vites their use against the defendant in a later sentencing or at a future 
trial. Conspiracy convictions are not "merged out of existence"218 
under the combination approach; less sophisticated jurisdictions may 
misperceive a defendant's record and count the conspiracy and CCE 
convictions independently in calculating a recidivist sentence. Thus, 
despite protestations to the contrary,219 a defendant in a combination 
214. See supra text accompanying notes 129-34; supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
215. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
216. See United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 931 F.2d 148, 153 (1st Cir.), cerL denied, 112 S. 
Ct. 184 (1991) ("Ifwe were to embrace the minority viewpoint and allow the conspiracy convic-
tion to stand on the theory that no additional punishment flowed from it, we would needlessly 
erode the prophlylaxis afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause."); Restrepo v. United States, 761 
F. Supp. 211, 217 (D. Mass. 1991) ("While the Second Circuit approach may indeed be sufficient 
to satisfy Ball, [there is] no basis for striking out in such new territory when the Supreme Court 
has spoken so clearly on the matter."). 
217. E.g., Rivera-Martinez. 931 F.2d at 153 ("Even a guilty defendant has constitutional 
rights. The Double Jeopardy Clause protects those rights. It requires that the section 846 con-
viction be erased from the docket."). 
218. United States v. Osorio Estrada, 751 F.2d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 1984), modified on other 
grounds, 151 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.), and cerL denied, 474 U.S. 830 (1985). 
219. See, e.g., United States v. Aiello, 771 F.2d 621, 633-34 (2d Cir. 1985) ("A combined 
lesser conviction could not properly be considered, for instance, in determining a defendant's 
eligibility for parole, in sentencing him in the future under a recidivist statute or in impeaching 
his credibility at a later trial."). The difficulty with this argument is that counting convictions for 
recidivist sentencing or impeachment purposes is often governed by state law under traditional 
notions of comity. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2607 (1991) ("Under our constitu-
tional system, the primary responsibility for defining crimes against state law, fixing punishments 
for the commission of these crimes, and establishing procedures for criminal trials rests with the 
States."); see also Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 790-91 (1969) (noting that adverse collat-
eral consequences can be generated by state law). Thus, the well-intentioned efforts of the combi-
nation approach may be undermined by the crude tools of state law. See supra notes 55-66 and 
accompanying text. 
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jurisdiction may encounter adverse collateral consequences. This risk 
also exists in the combination approach because of the ontological dif-
ficulty in understanding what "combining" convictions entails.220 
While this risk cannot be quantified, this Note contends that any risk 
of adverse collateral consequences merits the rejection of the combina-
tion approach.221 The Multiple Punishment Doctrine mandates that a 
defendant never be subjected to punishment for a lesser-included of-
fense. 222 The combination approach cannot guarantee that result. 
The risk of additional punishment exists so long as the convictions 
appear on the defendant's criminal record.223 
Moreover, the combination approach entails the risk that a trial 
court will improperly consider the defendant's conspiracy convictions 
in the sentencing process. This risk takes three forms. First, a trial 
court may improperly calculate a defendant's sentence under the sen-
tencing guidelines by assuming that the conspiracy convictions justify 
additional punishment and impose additional sentencing points upon a 
defendant for his or her "role in the offense."224 The additional points 
for conspiracy punish excessively because the penalty for concerted 
action is already reflected in the CCE sentence.22s Additionally, a trial 
judge may - consciously or unconsciously - rely on conspiracy con-
victions in establishing the defendant's base offense level.226 The sen-
220. See Osorio Estrada, 751 F.2d at 135 (Kearse, J., concurring); see also Thomas, supra 
note 11, at 1388 ("It is not clear just what is meant by 'combining' convictions."). 
221. See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-65 (1985); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 
784, 790-91 (1969); Restrepo v. United States, 761 F. Supp. 211, 217 (D. Mass. 1991) ("While 
the Second Circuit's approach may indeed be sufficient to satisfy Ball, [there is] no basis for 
striking out in such new territocy when the Supreme Court has spoken so clearly on the 
matter."). 
222. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977) ("[T]he Fifth Amendment forbids .•. cumula-
tive punishment for a greater and lesser-included olfense."). 
223. See Ball, 470 U.S. at 865 ("[TJhe presence of two convictions on the [defendant's] record 
may ... result in an increased sentence under a recidivist statute for a future olfense.") (emphasis 
added); cf. Thomas, supra note 11, at 1388 ("Creating quasi-convictions capable of springing into 
existence in the future is, however, a rather unusual solution to the multiple penalty problem."). 
224. See United States v. Nixon, 918 F.2d 895, 908 (11th Cir. 1990) ("[Vacation of conspir-
acy convictions] is especially indicated here, where the trial judge's reliance in sentencing on the 
lesser conspiracy count allowed a three to four level increase that is prohibited for the greater 
CCE count."). The guidelines generally allow for a four-level increase in the base olfense level 
"[i]f the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more 
participants." U.S.S.G., supra note 45, § 3Bl.l(a). Such conduct is part of the statutocy defini-
tion of a CCE, so a "role in the olfense" increase is prohibited for conspiratorial conduct in a 
continuing criminal enterprise. 
225. The sentencing guidelines prohibit enhancement of olfense levels for a defendant's role 
in a CCE olfense. See U.S.S.G., supra note 45, App. C amend. 66 background cmt. ("An adjust-
ment ... is not authorized because the olfense level [for CCE] already reflects an adjustment for 
role in the olfense."). 
226. See United States v. Bafia, 949 F.2d 1465, 1474 (7th Cir. 1991) ("the district court 
grouped the conspiracy and CCE convictions into one categoi:y and then applied the Guide-
lines"), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 1989 (1992); cf. United States v. Cloutier, 966 F.2d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 
1992) ("the court ... grouped the two counts together under U.S.S.G. § 3Dl.2(d) and applied 
the olfense guideline that produced the higher olfense level"). 
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tence then reflects an aggregation of convictions impermissible under 
the Multiple Punishment Doctrine. Finally, a trial court might rely 
on a defendant's conspiracy conviction in setting the defendant's sen-
tence within the range permissible under the sentencing guidelines.227 
While the Sentencing Commission has set rigid schedules for deter-
mining sentences, the trial judge retains discretion to fix a defendant's 
sentence within the range prescribed by the guidelines.228 The combi-
nation approach thus generates the risk that the sentencing judge will 
impose a sentence toward the upper end of the range because of the 
conspiracy convictions. The risk of these sentencing errors arises be-
cause the combination approach implicitly regards conspiracy convic-
tions as conduct independently warranting punishment.229 
Even assuming that the combination method effectively eliminates 
the possibility for adverse collateral consequences, the approach fails 
on policy grounds. Proponents have marshaled two policy arguments 
in favor of merging conspiracy convictions into the CCE conviction. 
Initially, the Second Circuit maintains that combining the convictions 
ensures that a defendant does not escape punishment in the event that 
his CCE conviction is overturned on appeal.230 In other words, the 
conspiracy convictions should be retained - albeit denied effect - as 
a basis for continued incarceration to further both penological objec-
tives and public safety. 
The continued incarceration argument is unpersuasive, however. 
State and federal appellate courts have long enjoyed the power to im-
pose a conviction for a lesser-included offense upon reversal of a 
greater offense.23 1 Courts justify this power, the constitutionality of 
which "has never seriously been questioned,"232 on two grounds. 
227. See United States v. Alvarez, 860 F.2d 801, 830 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[T]here remains the 
distinct possibility that the district court may have considered [the defendant's] guilt on the 
conspiracy conviction in sentencing him on the CCE conviction.''), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1051 
(1989). 
228. See U.S.S.G., supra note 45, § 2Al ("Pursuant to the [Sentencing Reform] Act, the 
sentencing court must select a sentence from within the guideline range. If, however, a particular 
case presents atypical features, the Act allows the court to depart from the guidelines and sen-
tence outside the prescribed range."). 
229. See, e.g., United States v. Osorio Estrada, 751 F.2d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 1984) (the conspir-
acy convictions are not "merged out of existence •.•. [and) the part of the conviction on the 
lesser offense [remains] unaffected should the compound offense be invalidated as a matter of 
law"), modified on other grounds, 757 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.), and cert. denied, 474 U.S. 830 (1985). 
230. See, e.g., United States v. Aiello, 771 F.2d 621, 634 (2d Cir. 1985) ("[T]he reactivation 
of the lesser conviction facilitates the congressional purpose of ensuring that a defendant is pun-
ished for whatever degree of a crime he is adjudged to be guilty of having committed.''); see also 
United States v. Blackston, 547 F. Supp. 1200, 1209-10 (S.D. Ga. 1982), modified sub nom. 
United States v. Brantley, 733 F.2d 1429 (11th Cir. 1984), and cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1006 (1985). 
231. See 3 WAYNER. LAFAVE &JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE§ 24.4(b)-(c) 
(1984 & Supp. 1991); see also Morris v. Mathews, 475 U.S. 237 (1986) (affirming a state appellate 
court's imposition of a conviction for a lesser-included offense). 
232. Dickenson v. Israel, 482 F. Supp. 1223, 1225 (E.D. Wis. 1980), a.ffd., 644 F.2d 308 (7th 
Cir. 1981). 
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First, courts possess the power under the common law to direct that a 
conviction for the lesser offense be entered since "[a] jury's finding of 
guilt on all elements of the greater offense is necessarily a finding of 
guilt on all elements of the lesser offense."233 Moreover, the federal 
judiciary can invoke the appellate courts' statutory authority to "mod-
ify . . . any judgment . . . and direct the entry of such appropriate 
judgment ... as may be just under the circumstances. "234 The combi-
nation approach, therefore, offers no advantage over the majority ap-
proach in this regard.235 Both methods guarantee the continued 
incarceration of potentially dangerous felons. 
In addition, the Second Circuit's fear that persons convicted of en-
gaging in a criminal enterprise will escape punishment absent the com-
bination approach is unjustified. First, if an appellate court reverses a 
CCE conviction because of evidentiary insufficiency, the inadequate 
proof will likely impugn a defendant's conspiracy convictions as well 
because conspiracy is an element of CCE. 236 The same logic applies to 
reversals for constitutional error - conspiracy and CCE convictions 
are often obtained pursuant to identical enforcement practices,237 so 
both convictions are likely to suffer from the same constitutional infir-
mity. 238 If the error does not infect the evidence of a conspiracy, the 
government is free to prosecute the defendant for that crime without 
233. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Josiah, 641 F.2d 1103, 1108 (3d Cir. 1981); see also 
United States v. Plenty Arrows, 946 F.2d 62, 66-67 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Dickinson, 
706 F.2d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Lamartina, 584 F.2d 764, 766-67 (6th Cir. 1978), 
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 928 (1979); United States v. Homing, 409 F.2d 424, 426 (4th Cir. 1969). 
234. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1988). For cases invoking this statutory authority to justify the impo-
sition of a conviction on a lesser offense, see Tinder v. United States, 345 U.S. 565, 570 (1953); 
United States v. Cobb, 558 F.2d 486, 489 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Industrial Lab. Co., 
456 F.2d 908, 911 (10th Cir. 1972); Allison v. United States, 409 F.2d 445, 450-51 (D.C. Cir. 
1969). 
235. Professor Thomas argues that "[a]llowing multiple convictions for the same offense to 
stand in case some of the convictions are reversed on appeal .•. permits the state to hedge its bets 
in a way that violates the underlying purpose of the multiple punishment doctrine." Thomas, 
supra note 11, at 1384 (footnote omitted). 
236. See United States v. Ordonez, 737 F.2d 793, 805-06 (9th Cir. 1983) (reversing convic-
tions for CCE and conspiracy because of evidence admitted in violation of the federal rules). 
237. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14 (government normally indicts defendants for 
both offenses). 
238. The Second Circuit has conceded this probability. See United States v. Aiello, 771 F.2d 
621, 634 n.8 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Naturally, the lesser conviction would only reactivate if the error 
that produced the reversal of the conviction on the greater offense was not one that also tainted 
the conviction on the lesser offense."). The combination approach thus appears to require exces-
sive appeals. If a CCE conviction is reversed due to error, the appellate court must remand to 
the trial court for resentencing. The defendant must again appeal to contest the conviction and 
sentence for conspiracy, even if the conviction is challenged on the same grounds as the CCE 
conviction. See infra text accompanying notes 244-48. 
Moreover, a defendant obtaining a reversal of his CCE conviction can generally be retried. 
See infra text accompanying note 245. Hence, vacating conspiracy convictions does not "immu-
nize[] [a defendant] from retrial." United States v. Blackston, 547 F. Supp. 1200, 1209 (S.D. Ga. 
1982), modified sub nom. United States v. Brauntley, 733 F.2d 1249 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 470 U.S. 1006 (1985). The Second Circuit has also acknowledged this scenario. See Aiello, 
771 F.2d at 634 ("If the government were able to retry the defendant on the greater charge and 
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offending the Double Jeopardy Clause.239 
The Ninth Circuit suggests a second policy advantage for the com-
bination approach - the conservation of scarce judicial resources. 
The Ninth Circuit reasons that the combination method avoids the 
need to remand a case to vacate conspiracy convictions because, upon 
affirmance of the CCE conviction, "the vacation will have been accom-
plished automatically."240 But this argument's appeal fades upon in-
spection. Initially, the majority approach also avoids unnecessary 
remands because the trial court must vacate the conspiracy convic-
tions at sentencing.241 Additionally, a CCE conviction will never be 
"affirmed" in the sense contemplated by the Ninth Circuit. A convic-
tion is normally subject to habeas corpus review,242 so the conspiracy 
convictions must remain in effect until the defendant completes the 
maximum possible sentence for conspiracy if the combination method 
is to achieve the desired result. Thus, conspiracy convictions will 
never be vacated "automatically"; they must be vacated by the trial 
court in order to be purged from a defendant's record.243 
The majority approach better avoids taxing judicial resources. 
· Under the combination approach, a defendant can initially appeal only 
the conviction and sentence for the CCE count because "the judgment 
on the lesser-included offense is not final until sentencing. "244 The 
combination approach then permits the conspiracy conviction to be 
chose to do so, any conviction on the greater would again replace the conviction on the lesser 
.... "). 
239. See United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964) (double jeopardy not implicated when 
the government retries a defendant following the reversal of a conviction). 
240. United States v. Medina, 940 F.2d 1247, 1253 (9th Cir. 1991). 
241. See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864 (1985) ("[T]he only remedy consistent with 
congressional intent is for the District Court, where the sentencing responsibility resides, to exer-
cise its discretion to vacate one of the underlying convictions."). 
242. "A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claim· 
ing the right ..• that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law ••. may 
move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence .••• at 
any time." 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988). But cf. Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 112 S. Ct. 
1652, 1653 (1992) (per curiam) (denying habeas motion because of "abusive delay"). 
243. The Second Circuit admits that "the convictions on the lesser counts ..• would not be 
merged out of existence." United States v. Osorio Estrada, 751 F.2d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 1984), 
modified on other grounds, 451 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.), and cert. denied, 474 U.S. 830 (1985). The 
merger doctrine generally requires a trial court to vacate convictions obtained for lesser-included 
offenses because they are said to "merge" into the conviction for the greater offense. See supra 
note 113. 
244. United States v. Stallings, 810 F.2d 973, 976 (10th Cir. 1987). The Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure provide that "[i]n a criminal case the notice of appeal by a defendant shall 
be filed in the district court within 10 days after the entry of .•. the judgment." FED. R. APP. P. 
4(b). A judgment must include both the verdict and a sentence. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(l) ("A 
judgment of conviction shall set forth the plea, the verdict or findings, and the adjudication and 
sentence.") (emphasis added); cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(2) ("After imposing sentence in a case 
which has gone to trial on a plea of not guilty, the court shall advise the defendant of the defend· 
ant's right to appeal ..•. ") (emphasis added). Thus, a defendant cannot appeal a "combined" 
conspiracy conviction until sentence has been imposed, which necessitates two sets of appeals in 
a combination approach jurisdiction. 
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revived if the appellate court reverses the CCE conviction. The case 
would be remanded to the trial court for sentencing on the defendant's 
conspiracy counts.245 Only after sentencing could the defendant ap-
peal the conspiracy conviction.246 Thus, "[t]he minority position may 
result in two appeals from the same trial."247 The majority approach 
avoids this possibility because the appellate court will necessarily re-
view the propriety of the conspiracy conviction when deciding to exer-
cise the authority to impose convictions for the lesser-included 
offenses.248 
The compatibility of the majority rule with traditional excessive 
punishment doctrine provides a compelling argument in its favor. 
Since the CCE statute requires proof of conspiratorial conduct,249 and 
Congress has not explicitly authorized cumulative punishment,250 
courts should vacate conspiracy convictions.251 The vacation ap-
proach also realizes the values underlying the Multiple Punishment 
Doctrine. For example, the majority rule eliminates the possibility of 
adverse consequences flowing from separate convictions for CCE and 
conspiracy, a critical factor in the Supreme Court's multiple punish-
ment analysis.252 A defendant faces no danger of future collateral con-
sequences under the majority approach, which purges the invalid 
convictions from the defendant's record.253 
CONCLUSION 
The Double Jeopardy Clause is among the most powerful and im-
portant aspects of the Bill of Rights. The Multiple Punishment Doc-
trine, derived from the Clause, is designed to further several goals, 
including limiting the potential for prosecutorial abuse, preserving the 
separation of powers, and preserving a criminal defendant's interest in 
finality. Permitting courts to impose conspiracy convictions for be-
havior identical to that deemed necessary by Congress to establish the 
separate offense of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise poses a 
unique challenge to the prohibition on cumulative punishment. Re-
taining conspiracy convictions imposes excessive punishment on the 
criminal defendant because such convictions risk consequences ad-
245. United States v. Aiello, 771 F.2d 621, 634 n.8 (2d Cir. 1985). 
246. Stallings, 810 F.2d at 976. 
247. 810 F.2d at 976. 
248. See United States v. Plenty Arrows, 946 F.2d 62, 66-67 (8th Cir. 1991); Government of 
the Virgin Islands v. Josiah, 641 F.2d 1103, 1108-09 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Lamartina, 
584 F.2d 764, 766-67 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 928 (1979); Allison v. United States, 
409 F.2d 445, 450-52 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (all reviewing evidence in favor oflesser-included offense). 
249. See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text. 
250. See supra notes 173-83 and accompanying text. 
251. See supra text accompanying note 69. 
252. See supra text accompanying notes 46-52. 
253. See supra text accompanying notes 214-15. 
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verse to the defendant beyond those intended by Congress. Eliminat-
ing conspiracy convictions from a defendant's criminal record is the 
only constitutionally sufficient response to the multiple punishment 
problem in the continuing criminal enterprise context. 
The majority approach, mandating the vacation of lesser-included 
conspiracy convictions when a court simultaneously convicts a defend-
ant of operating a continuing criminal enterprise, best addresses the 
risk of cumulative punishment through adverse collateral conse-
quences. Even assuming that the combination method could avoid 
collateral consequences, the policy advantages proffered by the circuits 
adhering to the combination approach do not justify experimentation 
given the Supreme Court's clear expression in Ball v. United States of 
the constitutional need to vacate lesser-included convictions. Indeed, 
the vacation approach also prevails on policy grounds. The majority 
approach permits the judiciary to ensure that defendants will remain 
incarcerated if the court reverses their CCE conviction, and the vaca-
tion of convictions best conserves scarce judicial resources by avoiding 
two sets of appeals from the same trial. 
